



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**FEAR AND ATTRACTION IN STATECRAFT: WESTERN
MULTILATERALISM'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS**

by

Emory J. Hayes

June 2013

Thesis Advisor:
Co-Advisor:

Donald Abenheim
Carolyn Halladay

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2013	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE FEAR AND ATTRACTION IN STATECRAFT: WESTERN MULTILATERALISM'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Emory J. Hayes				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) From the Peace of Westphalia to the present, the ruling elites of kingdoms and states have attempted one international bargain after another for a variety of purposes. Whether it is to protect the integrity of a ruling system such as aristocratic orders, the prevention of power politics, or the mere hope of avoiding the scourge of world war, the West has consistently sought to use multilateral institutions to accomplish these ends, among others. What causes these multilateral attempts to succeed or fail, and more importantly, what is multilateralism's center of gravity? This thesis suggests that the fear and attractions of state leaders—and the circumstance within which they perceive these fears and attractions—is the center of gravity of the West's most important multilateral attempts. These attempts include the Peace of Westphalia, the British Act of Union, the Congress System, the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, it is these human traits among elite figures in the context of historical study that best explain the success or failure of Western Multilateralism over that of the application of theoretical sciences.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Multilateralism, Europe, United States, Britain, France, Germany, Soviet Union, Thomas Aquinas, Niccoló Machiavelli, Peace of Westphalia, The Concert of Europe, The Congress System, Power Politics, The League of Nations, The United Nations, NATO, The European Union			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 107	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**FEAR AND ATTRACTION IN STATECRAFT: WESTERN
MULTILATERALISM'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS**

Emory J. Hayes
Major, United States Army
B.S., North Georgia College and State University, 2002

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (EUROPE AND EURASIA)

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2013**

Author: Emory J. Hayes

Approved by: Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Carolyn Halladay
Thesis Co-Advisor

Harold Trinkunas
Chair, Department

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

From the Peace of Westphalia to the present, the ruling elites of kingdoms and states have attempted one international bargain after another for a variety of purposes. Whether it is to protect the integrity of a ruling system such as aristocratic orders, the prevention of power politics, or the mere hope of avoiding the scourge of world war, the West has consistently sought to use multilateral institutions to accomplish these ends, among others. What causes these multilateral attempts to succeed or fail, and more importantly, what is multilateralism's center of gravity?

This thesis suggests that the fear and attractions of state leaders—and the circumstance within which they perceive these fears and attractions—is the center of gravity of the West's most important multilateral attempts. These attempts include the Peace of Westphalia, the British Act of Union, the Congress System, the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, it is these human traits among elite figures in the context of historical study that best explain the success or failure of Western Multilateralism over that of the application of theoretical sciences.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	FEAR AND ATTRACTION IN STATECRAFT: WESTERN MULTILATERALISM'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS.....	1
A.	CENTERS OF GRAVITY AMONG CENTRIPETAL AND CENTRIFUGAL FORCES.....	3
B.	PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES	4
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	12
D.	METHODS AND SOURCES	16
E.	THESIS OVERVIEW	16
II.	MULTILATERALISM'S BRITISH EXAMPLE.....	19
A.	TOGETHERNESS BY CIRCUMSTANCE.....	19
B.	PROTESTANT UNITY AND THE CATHOLIC THREAT.....	22
C.	EMPIRE, PROFITS, SCOTTISH AMBITION, AND MUTUAL ELEVATION.....	25
D.	BRITISH AMERICANS: FEAR AND ATTRACTION LOST	28
III.	POWER POLITICS' RISE AND EUROPE'S ETHICAL DILEMMA	31
A.	FAITH, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND RULERS.....	32
B.	THE THIRTY YEARS WAR, THE RISE OF STATES, AND A NEW DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM.....	34
C.	RESTRAINT'S PENDULUM: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION'S AFTERMATH TO WORLD WAR I.....	39
D.	CONCLUSION	45
IV.	EUROPE'S INTER-WAR PERIOD AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS	47
A.	WOODROW WILSON, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND ALTRUISM'S ENDURING WEAKNESS.....	48
B.	THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE DEMISE OF WILSON'S LIBERAL ALTRUISM.....	52
C.	THE AGGRESSION OF JAPAN, THE RISE OF HITLER, AND THE EMASCULATION OF THE LEAGUE	54
D.	CONCLUSION	57
V.	THE COLD WAR: BOLD BEGGAR STATES, BENIGN HEGEMONY, AND VIRTUOUS SELFISHNESS.....	59
A.	THE EUROPEAN COMMONER: FROM A NATIONALIST "MALTHUSIAN" TO A VIRTUOUS BRAT	61
B.	THE UNITED NATIONS	67
C.	THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION	71
D.	CONCLUSION	78
VI.	THEN, NOW, AND THE FUTURE.....	81
A.	YESTERDAY'S SOLUTIONS AS TOMORROW'S PROBLEMS	83
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	91
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	95

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

With great pleasure, I give thanks to those who enabled me to make this thesis a high-quality work. I am particularly grateful to Professor Carolyn Halladay for her superb guidance in research and writing. She helped me to improve my ability to think like a historian and author. Additionally, I am thankful to Professor Donald Abenhiem. Without his initial interest and intellectual support, this thesis would not have been focused, engaging, and sophisticated. He sparked my interest in the nuanced and challenging arenas of liberal, and nationalist thought that played such an important role in my research.

Above all, the highest gratitude goes to my dear wife. It was her patience of my near constant absence from the home and her dedication in raising our three wonderful daughters that enabled me the time and motivation to meet my academic challenges. Without her, this would not have been possible.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. FEAR AND ATTRACTION IN STATECRAFT: WESTERN MULTILATERALISM'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS

Continental Europe's multilateral attempts at diplomacy to prevent war and devastation among its several nations often finally failed until the post-World War II international order. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia sought to prevent religious and populist passions from overthrowing Europe's great powers yet the French Revolution and Napoleon's Grand Armee destroyed that international order. The later Concert or Classical System, from 1815 until 1853, aimed to prevent the rise of another populist and revolutionary threat but was destroyed from within by the Industrial Revolution and the rise of a newly unified Germany. The Classical System of alliances crafted in the 1880s in the end actually contributed to both the outbreak and massiveness of World War I.¹ Finally, the League of Nations' failure to contain internal revolutions and expansionist Germany and Japan in the midst of the Great Depression led to the outbreak of World War II, particularly after Hitler first left the League and then thwarted it to prevent retaliation of his early aggressions.²

Despite all of checkered experience of great power failures, the ideals of these international bargains stayed alive, and those unique European values of togetherness, tolerance, and restraint found a home in the United Kingdom. Through compromise and circumstance, rather than conquest, the kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Wales began a long path that began with Queen Elizabeth's death in 1606 and eventually formed a new British nation, and, more importantly, a common British identity. More impressively, this British experiment, one centered on common interest and compromise, overcame a history of bloodshed and cultural rivalry within itself every bit as bitter as those within continental Europe.³

¹ Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig, and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 4th Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) xiv-4, 24-60, 269-279.

² George Gill, *The League of Nations: From 1929 to 1946* (New York: Avery, 1996), 7-12.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, xiv-4, 269-279.

³ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 1-54.

Fortunately, the British example is not the only occurrence of multilateral success in Europe. The emergence of a post-World War II international order in the late 1940s and its institutional design centered on the United Nations and NATO did not only end centuries of inter-European conflict, but protected Europe from the Soviet Union and nuclear holocaust with the upshot of peace in 1989. These new multilateral systems founded and designed by the West—a family now including the powerful United States in the NATO alliance and U.N. Security Council—brought periods of relative peace to the world unknown in centuries before the 1980s. While this peaceful environment has had its constant spouts of rivalry between members—especially between the United States, France, and the Soviet Union/Russia—the values of restraint, togetherness, and the abhorrence of *Machtpolitik* have not only solidified Europe’s peace and prosperity, but have permeated and affected the whole globe to varying—yet significant—degrees.

Why did this peace eventuate in the face of such much failure of other state systems and great power arrangements? How did Europe’s attempts at conciliatory international orders in the past fail so violently yet succeed so enduringly—albeit ambivalently—after World War II? This thesis aims to answer those questions by determining the most important forces responsible for this change. What are the most important forces, or centers of gravity, that best explain the success or failure of Western multilateral institutions to achieve peaceful, collective, and prosperous togetherness over narrow national self-interest and *Machtpolitik*?⁴

This thesis argues that the key two forces that allow multilateral institutions to survive and function are fear and attraction and their effect on countries’ decision makers. Additionally, fear and attraction in statecraft signify both double-edged swords of domestic and international politics. These two forces of statecraft can both strengthen and weaken multilateral institutions.

⁴ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 70–101.

A. CENTERS OF GRAVITY AMONG CENTRIPETAL AND CENTRIFUGAL FORCES

In order to communicate the essence of a center of gravity one must turn to the term's theoretical founder as such applies to how nations deal with each other. Considered by many to be the foremost thinker of military matters, Prussian military officer Carl von Clausewitz described the human element in war by portraying combat's exercise as a friction-dominated event affected by everything from organization and leadership to the fighting spirit of the masses of soldiers seeking to accomplish their objectives over their exhaustion and primal fear. In *On War*, one of the key elements that Clausewitz determines necessary for victory is a strategy that protects one's own and destroys the enemy's center of gravity. Sometimes this center of gravity is an enemy capital; other times it may be the enemy's army or leader, and still other times it may be as nuanced as a public's faith in a government's political legitimacy or the general faith in an ideological cause; ultimately, the center of gravity is the one thing that will mean failure for the belligerent that loses it. For example, during World War II, the German center of gravity was likely as concrete as its capital city. During the American Civil War, the center of gravity ended up being as nuanced and decentralized as the common Southerner's will to fight—a will that was not defeated until General Sherman's destructive march through the heart of the South.⁵

What Clausewitz makes clear is that every war has its own center of gravity and every war is unique. Multilateral diplomacy is similar to war; it is human, full of friction, and like war, its center of gravity differs across Western multilateralism's wide array of history and circumstance; therefore, Clausewitz's concept of center of gravity is the ideal ideation that will be used to identify Western multilateral institutions key centripetal and centrifugal forces.⁶

The most profound problems concerning the identification and relevance of the forces involved with surviving multilateral institutions are the diverse elements that

⁵ Norman Friedman, *Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interest* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2001), 128.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 74–100.

contribute as centripetal and centrifugal elements in multilateral cohesion and momentum. An initial, but incomplete list of the possible centers of gravity and other contributing forces include: diplomatic efficiency, realist balancing and buck-passing, burden-sharing and shifting, prosperity from economic interdependence creating momentum for institutions, faith in Kantian peace theories, adverseness to *Machtpolitik* socialized from two world wars, normative values of the West, the Cold War, interest of the U.S. hegemon, genius of the institutions original design, detrimental alternatives, value of human rights, goals of peaceful socialization, political will and many other factors.⁷

What this thesis attempts to establish is a much shorter list that can be heuristically but effectively summarized—while being all encompassing—as the most important centers of gravity that allow multilateral institutions to be effective enough to survive. *In other words, what are Western multilateralism’s centers of gravity?*

B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Western multilateralism and its institutions are different things to different people; the ire displayed by the Federal Republic of Germany after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a prime example. The George W. Bush administration viewed multilateral organizations as merely a means to support its own national interest, while the Germans view the modern conciliatory world order as an end in its unique history inherited from Bismarck and Hitler. On the one hand, U.S. history brims with pride concerning both world wars; the United States sees itself as the savior of the West and democracy. On the other hand, the Germans’ view of their past centers on German unilateral action being the cause of these wars. As such, a key part of their redemption, and re-entrance into a respectable world order, was NATO’s need of their contribution for the defense of Europe under an international order based on multilateral consensus. Therefore, the mere

⁷ Peter Pham, “Brave Not-So-New World: A Case for Realism and Multilateralism,” *The National Interest* (April 2004): <http://nationalinterest.org/article/brave-not-so-new-world-a-case-for-realism-and-multilateralism-2619>; Edward Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) 87–90; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, xiv–4; Wallace Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden Shifting* (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2003) 84–85, 250–258.

thought of acting outside Western international values and consensus is anathema to Germany's contemporary essence.

This divergence of views undergirds very different ideas (and policies) on maintaining and advancing the Western system of statecraft and security. To Germans and other European critics, particularly after the widespread anti-American demonstrations in Europe on 15 February 2003, the U.S. rejection of international restraint, combined with the unmatched U.S. military, actually poses a threat to the international system—a system they need to be comfortable with their redemptive identity as a leader of a civilized and relevant Europe. After all, if the Washington feels free to disregard the international system, what is to keep less benevolent nations from feeling empowered to do the same? Thus, traditional allies with a history of fruitful cooperation become unfriendly during the Iraq War.⁸

But why does the rest of Europe see multilateral institutions so differently from the United States? One key difference is the power of the United States compared to its European allies; Washington nearly has more economic power than all of the EU members combined and nearly equals the rest of the world in defense spending.⁹ Europe is to a degree dependent on these multilateral institutions not only for common security against a less conciliatory world, but also against U.S. hegemony; however, it is this hegemon that has and continues to provide the secure environment that Europe craves and prospers from.

Conversely, Washington wants Europe to accept more responsibility and acquire more military power so that it may take some of the world's security burden off the United States' back. However, Washington still wants to lead and control the transatlantic

⁸ Rober Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review No.* 113 (June and July 2002): 3–18.; Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 9–12.

⁹ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Field Listing: GDP* (Washington, DC: OPA, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/contact-cia/index.html>. [The EU GDP is 16.21 trillion USD and U.S. GDP is 15.65]; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook* (2012). <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/04>. [U.S. defense spending was 766 billion USD in 2012 and nearly equaled the rest of the world combined.]

community to benefit U.S. interest through its central role in NATO, which is something that Europe dislikes yet desires all at the same time.¹⁰

NATO is the best example of multilateralism's essence. It is nations wanting their cake and eating it too. This simple observation allows multilateral institutions to be seen in their proper light: They are ambivalent and have myriad forces pulling their cohesion apart, and yet fears of alternatives, namely multilateralism without Washington's power and *Machtpolitik* itself, pushing them together. While the NATO example is but a tip of the iceberg, the same forces that pull apart and push its unity together is similar to the internal and interest based challenges of all Western multilateral institutions present and past. It is the conflict, down to each individual nation, between national self-interest and the common good that gives Western multilateralism its essence. Therefore, identifying the centripetal and centrifugal forces that determine togetherness or disunity becomes difficult to accomplish given the multitudes of diverging interests between different nations sharing common goals. Because all of these nations, from the powerful United States to tiny Belgium, multiply considerations of the national self-interest versus the collective good; therefore, the challenge is to identify the most important forces of Western multilateral bargains that cut across history back to the Peace of Westphalia and are present in the current international order. The forces that are most present and relevant throughout history are Western multilateralism's centers of gravity.¹¹

Western multilateralism, however, goes beyond the simple self-interest, fears, and attractions of various states; it is also a matter of morals and the constant dispute of what is considered to be right, wrong, naïve, safe, dangerous, or reckless in the minds of man. Above all, the moral elements of multilateralism are paradoxical; if altruism can be exploited by adversaries, noble peace-seeking ideals merely disadvantage the inhabitants of a state. Accordingly, defending the inhabitants of the state could be viewed as altruistic in itself. The historical thinkers that best promote and provide the philosophical arguments to the various sides of this debate are Saint Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel

¹⁰ Kagan, "Power and Weakness," 3–18.; Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 84–85, 250–258.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 250–258.

Kant on the altruistic multilateral side and Niccoló Machiavelli with Carl Schmitt on the other.

In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas, based on writings from Saint Augustine, articulated the view that rulers had an obligation to conduct wars only if those wars were just. Aquinas made clear that wars were only just if they were carried out by a legitimate ruler, done to right a wrong, and sought lasting peace as the end goal. This moral code was later promoted and enlarged by clergymen who determined that an international system was needed to enforce such lofty standards, ensure that wars were indeed just, and save Christendom from endless and senseless violence that would undoubtedly occur without such moral international restraints between rulers that would always feel threatened by their neighbors. In this way, the ultimate goal of peace was served by an interstate order that had distinctively multilateral characteristics.¹²

Niccoló Machiavelli resoundingly rejected this ethical paradigm three centuries later. Machiavelli was a man of prominence in the republic of Florence at the turn of the 16th century when the French conquered his city-state. Possibly due to this experience of invasion, as well as the imprisonment and torture he endured while in French custody, Machiavelli adopted the view that the consequences of losing made victory necessary at all costs. He elaborated this paradigm in his 1513 work *The Prince*:

You must know that there are two methods of fighting, one by law, the other by force; the first method is that of men, the second of beasts; but as the first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second. It is therefore necessary for a prince to know well how to use both the beast and the man.¹³

Machiavelli's words echo both the fear that comes from having been a victim to "force" and the "beasts" that wielded it, and the attraction of having a strong and victorious state—even if doing so requires less than ethical means. Indeed, his personal experience likely also cast a cold, critical light on any cherished notions of a mutually peaceable community of Christian European territories; war and survival were the order

¹² Paul Sigmund, ed., *St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 64–65.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 5–6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 6.

of the day. Machiavelli later writes in *The Prince* that leaders must “keep good faith and live with integrity,” but the interest of the state is paramount and “the end justifies the means.”¹⁴ Machiavelli viewed the world as a zero-sum environment that would always have winners and suffering losers, and, a good ruler should ensure his country and subjects were among the victorious side; not doing so was a failure to protect his subjects’ interests and welfare.

The philosophical arguments against Machiavelli—like those of Benard du Rosier and numerous other thinkers influenced by Aquinas’ writings—sought a peaceful multilateral security centered on normative standards over that of Machiavellian security provided by power. These clergymen stressed the incontrovertible reality of interdependence between states; they also believed the brutality of war forced upon leaders a moral obligation to temper ambition with international norms of restraint, conciliation, and consultation. In other words, these clergymen placed a moral value on peace itself and therefore saw just wars as a necessary evil to achieve a latter peace and unjust wars as completely immoral and therefore must be prevented.

Machiavelli placed the moral imperative on leaders to protect their land and people. Therefore, even benevolent rulers had the following ethical dilemma: Though the just-war ethical code and its multilateral offshoot philosophies were peace seeking and favorable to God’s and the Church’s will, adherence to this ethical standard could lead to rulers and their subjects alike to fall under the yoke of foreign oppression if other rulers took advantage of this benevolent code. Conversely, while reliance on state power gave rulers and their subjects less risk of foreign oppression, the means to accomplish this protection through superior power encouraged rulers to enter war for the sake of power alone and that would make war more or less constant.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid, 7.

¹⁵ Ibid, 5–6. The fact that all of these men lived in Florence, Milan, Mantua, or Tuscany—all states relatively small that faced threats not only from one another, but larger nations from outside their region, perhaps explain their paradigms of accepting rivalry’s reality while simultaneously restraining their actions in case that they needed each other to confront a larger threat from outside their region later on. In other words the opinions of these Renaissance multilateral thinkers are made from positions of desperation.

Neither the multilateral just-war philosophies nor the Machiavellian philosophical counterpart had a monopoly on either fear or attraction. On the one hand, multilateral just war philosophies feared that international anarchy forced rulers to engage in constant war for no other reason than self-preservation, creating a vicious cycle. These clergymen were also attracted to peace as a normative virtue and that in itself made their multilateral preference a moral issue rather than an issue of states' interests. On the other hand, the fear of invasion—in the present or the future—caused Machiavellian thought to view altruistic desires of peace for peace's sake as an ironic moral evil. Because the threat of invasion, or the rise of a rival's power could make an invasion more likely in the future, rulers' fears caused them to be attracted to Machiavellian philosophy because more state power alleviated fears of invasion. In other words, multilateral just war philosophers feared war and were attracted to peace, while Machiavellian proponents feared losing wars and were attracted to security in the form of greater power.

In later times this religious versus state interest debate became liberal versus absolutism within the multilateral paradox. Prussian enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant proposed that peace was an accidental state of affairs but one that could be made long-lasting if democratic republicanism replaced absolutist regimes given that monarchs tend to enjoy the continuity of court life as the people suffer the scourge of war. Furthermore, a league of nations could be formed to preserve peace and foster prosperity if all the nations adopted liberal republics because no self-ruled people would commit themselves to the unpleasantness of war. To Kant, peace's best chance was political and self-interested commoner's desires rather than religious, but the goal of peace as an end within itself over that of national security through power was also in its self a continuity with Aquinian thought from earlier times. It was simply a matter of the West having enough democratic governance to ensure "perpetual peace."¹⁶

Carl Schmitt was to Kantian thought what Machiavelli was to Aquinian thought: a cold shock of reality to altruistic and democratic dreams of "perpetual peace" theory. Schmitt was an interwar German philosopher of conservative persuasion; however,

¹⁶ Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986), Kindle edition, chap. 1.

conservatism in the Weimar context meant protection of the state against accesses of individual and democratic liberalism and should not be confused with modern day free market conservatism represented by the likes of American Republicans, British Conservatives, or the German Christen Democrats. Before the rise of the Nazis, Schmitt feared that the liberal and democratic nature of Weimar Germany left the state open to be liberally overran by radicals on the far right or left who would later turn the state into one of their own image after taking charge. Essentially, he saw the immerging political liberalism in Europe as an ideological presence harmful to the ultimate peace and prosperity of the people because people would vote for the benefit of themselves rather than for the benefit of the state, and according to Schmitt, the nation-state itself allowed for the conditions of stability and a decent life. In other words, he believed the liberal democracy unchecked would lead to the individual citizen separating himself from the nation and state only to attach himself to his political faction, which would weaken the state as a nation and turn the government into a state of an exclusive ideology making enemies of its own national people. He later turned Nazi after the rise of Hitler for various reasons, with anti-Semitism being one of the more prominent ones, along with his desire not be viewed as an outsider by the Nazi regime; however, his political warnings of the fate of the liberal Weimar Germany were prescient indeed.¹⁷

Schmitt, however, offers more than just a counter to Kantian thought for the purpose of this thesis. Additionally, it is his observations of human nature that highlight two stark realities. First, altruism—whether it is Aquinian or Kantian—is nothing more than another method of determining who has political power. If states agree to be multilaterally restrained from war or internationally committed to enforcing peace, they—if they are truly committed to such—must have a political power or force of some kind forcing them to do as such and that dictates that somebody else has that power to compel—through force or other means—whether it is based on liberal methods or not. In other words, who rules and decides politically for this multilateral entity? Second, according to Schmitt, man is dictated by his drives and the two most dominating drives

¹⁷ Tracy Strong, “Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate Around Carl Schmitt,” in *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), Kindle edition.

are love and fear. Man is not dangerous because of his fear, but because of his fear he must give himself “fearfulness” as in the ability to make others fear him so that he may have the power—political, military, or otherwise—to ensure he is more safe and can feel less fear.¹⁸ In other words, altruism does not matter in the end, but fear does.

Given that national leaders are individual creatures driven by fear and the attraction to lessen their fear, it is what drives fear and attraction that determine their actions concerning their role in multilateral institutions. This is not to say that it is impossible for altruism and normative ideals of peace and freedom to matter, in fact the United States demonstrates this; however, the United States is an anomaly more so than the norm given that the nation in its nascent was founded on the fear of a tyrannical government and made altruistic ideals such as liberty a political force. Likewise, Western Europe embraced the leadership of the United States within the United Nations and NATO for their fear of domestic upheaval and Soviet domination after World War II and the Cold War; therefore, the post-World War II multilateral order was attractive to alleviate both fears all the while allowing liberal altruism to become an element of political force itself through elections.

The center of gravity concerning multilateralism is ultimately a dynamic of individual men and women. They fear losing sovereignty or political influence if they are a head of state, average citizens fear not only foreign invasion but the tyranny of their own governments, and all, whether they be elite or commoner, are all attracted to alleviating fear. It is in this human trait of fear, and the circumstances that these individuals exist within, that determine whether their own decision-making calculations make multilateral institutions effective because multilateral institutions are ultimately only empowered to do what the states they consist of permit the international body to achieve. Therefore, *Western multilateralism’s center of gravity is the fear and attraction of state decision makers*. Ironically, the philosophical ideations that provide the most effective insight to understand and maintain the peaceful multilateral order of the democratic West today come from the military minded Clausewitz and a Nazi.

¹⁸ Leo Strauss, “Notes on Carl Schmitt,” in *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), Kindle edition.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The arguments concerning multilateralism consist of IR theory, which attempts to explain and predict, and the historical method, which attempts to explain by providing chronology, cause, effect, and judgment of the past that affect our current circumstances. The IR field can be separated into numerous distinct arguments that not only disagree on the dynamics of multilateral organizations but also disagree on these institutions' relevance, purpose, and general essence.

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in *Security Communities* best establish the core element in the various IR theories' divergence by asking if the absence of war is caused by "material forces alone or of material and normative forces."¹⁹ Essentially, do values and norms matter? While the realists have moderated throughout generations, they still view multilateral institutions as bodies that are nothing more than elements of their environment predetermined by the interest of great powers or superpowers. As E.H. Carr suggests, "to internationalize government in any real sense means to internationalize power."²⁰ Carr also suggests in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* that the power of individual nations within multilateral organizations matters most. Rather it is smaller countries following suit with Britain and France's exit of the gold standard, or militarily weak countries seeking the shadow of great powers to protect themselves, the advantages of power make these organizations merely a different method of great powers using international systems to their advantage.²¹ He also rejects altruism as naïve by stating, "It is profoundly misleading to represent the struggle between satisfied and dissatisfied Powers as a struggle between morality on one side and power on the other."²² Essentially, multilateralism is simply a tool of power and the value of normative motivations is futile.

¹⁹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 10.

²⁰ Robert Kaplan, *Warrior Politics* (New York: Random House, 2002) 145.

²¹ Edward Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) 104–105.

²² *Ibid.*, 195.

One of the most profound works to date on liberal IR theory is *Triangulating Peace* by Bruce Russett and John Oneal. This book and the larger liberal community see multilateral institutions as a beneficial result and reinforcement of liberal governance and economic interdependence between states. As disciples of Kantian peace theories, Russett and Oneal explain that democratic institutions have the desire for peace because their leaders are beholden to electorates and the misery of war makes people not want to experience it without good cause. Because free people like economic prosperity—and economic interdependence is a method of gaining that goal—war is not only discouraged by the will of the people for normative reasons, but the prosperity of economic interdependence can be interrupted by violent conflict. Because free people like peace and prosperity, free governments have the motivation to standardize trade and commerce practices between nations to increase prosperity and seek long lasting peace. These dynamics, according to liberals, allow liberal governance to solidify freedom’s benefits through multilateral organizations and reinforce democracy and interdependence due to their common democratic values.²³ Essentially, liberals believe in the power of liberal civilization to overcome the *Kultur* of zero-sum power politics.²⁴

Social constructivists, on the other hand, credit common efforts and togetherness between nations to mankind’s innate nature. By combining psychological theories of identity formulation with the international relations community, constructivist credit our heuristic nature of viewing the world as “we” and “others” as the reason multilateralism and peace itself can exist. Much like a person raised in the American South would view himself as a Georgian, a “Southerner,” and an American, the international community subscribes to multiple identities or indicators at one time. Additionally, this approach allows disparate groups to interchange their relation to one another. For example, while a Californian may view this same hypothetical Georgian as an “other” within the confines of American regions, the Georgian “other” forms part of a “we” when the Californian is confronted by, say, Italians or other international identities. Whether it is NATO or the

²³ Ibid, 24–28, 39, 303.

²⁴ Victoria Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th–Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005) 21.

EU, constructivists argue that it is human nature for the democratic free West to find common identity due to its common enlightenment values and intertwined history when contrasted to the authoritarian nature of the old Soviet bloc or the less liberal remainder of the world.²⁵

Additionally, these identities are malleable through exposure; by the world being interconnected and interdependent, constructivists predict that the globalized and post-modern world will lose much of its past hostility as we are more familiar with those “others” we used to fear, and therefore, this lessening of fear will allow the preconditions of past conflicts to be abated. Thomas Risse, an ardent constructivist, argues in *A Community of Europeans*, that the European Union will experience wide (mass acceptance) and deep (an article of faith) success because Europeans are constantly exposed to each other through business, media exposure, and common interest concerning economic wellbeing proliferated through a common European market. Therefore, constructivists view multilateral institutions as a symptom and vital enhancer of common identities and a conciliatory international order for that matter.²⁶

Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig, and Alexander George’s *Force and Statecraft* provide a diplomatic historians’ take on multilateral institutions. By crediting a “longstanding and enduring human desire to find limits and to appreciate their value in restraining destructive competition and violence” the authors attribute common security’s failure and success to the myriad forces present at the time of conflict that determine if the established international order is able to overcome its internal and external challenges.²⁷ By covering history from the Peloponnesian War to the modern era, the authors determine that in order for common security to work it must have: a genuine consensus and “shared goals,” an appropriate structure and a “status hierarchy among them,” “accepted values and procedures,” and “it must be able to adapt to new developments and

²⁵ Thomas Risse, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres* (London: Cornell University Press, 2010) 1–87, 243.

²⁶ Ibid, 1–87, 243.

²⁷ Paul Lauren, Gordon Graig, and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 266.

to internal changes within its membership.”²⁸ *Force and Statecraft* is written by two diplomatic historians and a political scientist and, thus, lacks the constraints of IR paradigms and attempts to explain the events of past multilateral attempts through chronology, cause, effect, and judgment.

Another historical perspective to understand how the West moved from a warring environment to its modern conciliatory form is Victoria de Grazia’s *Irresistible Empire*. Grazia demonstrates how consumerism allowed a revolution from below to transform everything about Europe; her work suggests that the changed nature of the wants and needs of Europeans at all social levels after World War II were transformed by American business practices, namely mass consumerism, and made internal and international conflicts from Europe’s past anachronistic. It was a change of (and in) the masses that forced upon European leaders a new paradigm making international trade and social welfare—not war—paramount in modern times. Therefore, European commoners moved away from nationalist or communist ideologies as a zero-sum means for acquiring needs and wants to, instead, demanding the opportunity to purchase washing machines, microwaves, and other “electronic servants” through American style capitalism based on economic growth that eased past ideological and class divisions and transformed these former divisions into nothing more than segments of a market to be profited from by big business. Essentially, a lack of scarcity brought about after the end of World War II in Europe created a condition favorable to multilateralism.²⁹

While the historical works on European history concerning the forces that dictate multilateral institutions’ behavior are too numerous to cover in this thesis, it is historical method and recognition of underlying political and cultural forces at all levels—from the commoner to national leader—that makes a detailed study of historical literature—rather than IR literature—the key to supporting this thesis. Therefore, historical works like *Force and Statecraft* and *Irresistible Empire* are the best method to explain multilateral institutions’ centers of gravity.

²⁸ Ibid, xiv–xv.

²⁹ De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 458–480.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

The research question will be addressed by a historical study of Western multilateral attempts within the context of the British Act of Union and its aftermath, the post-Westphalia age of power politics, the European inter-war period, and the Cold War. This historical study will identify trends and forces necessary to separate centers of gravity concerning multilateral institutions from its myriad and less relevant dynamics.

This is a historical study of the chronology, cause, effect, and judgment of the actors within these systems to determine what key ingredients are needed for multilateral institutions to be effective to a reasonable extent. Such analysis is not a pure science, but an art. The object is to identify forces that beget effective multilateral institutions rather than using them to validate a specific IR theory. Much like Carl von Clausewitz considered in his *Meisterstück, on War*, to be a study of the art and not the science or theory of war, this thesis considers the human element involved with this complicated and nuanced subject to beyond the concrete level of any theoretical science and will not be treated as such. Therefore, it is only fitting that Clausewitz's concept of wars having a center of gravity is ideal to explain Western multilateralism; for multilateralism, like war, are human experiences consisting of logic, passions, chance, and above all ... friction.³⁰

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

The first chapter will present the British unification as a microcosm of civilizing forces overcoming cultural divergence as an example of multilateralism done right and lessons learned from this will be used as a transition to continental Europe's less successful multilateral experience. The second chapter will provide an analysis of the multilateral systems in Europe from the Thirty Years War to World War I with emphasis on how fear and attraction dictated the methods state leaders used when seeking their regimes' security; one way was nation-state military power and the other was international multilateral restraint. The third chapter will cover the interwar period between World War I and World War II and describe how a predominately democratic, nationalist, and war adverse Europe ended one world war to only create the conditions

³⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 74–100

necessary for fear and attraction to bring about the demise of the League of Nations along with a second and worse world war.

The fourth and final chapter will cover the post-World War II order and the Cold War. This chapter will demonstrate how the weakening of Europe, rise of American and Soviet superpowers, nuclear weapons, and American styled consumerism changed the essence of every European and gave multilateralism a favorable environment. Afterwards, the thesis's conclusion will explain how fear and attraction have benefited the post-Cold War world order, but however, will also explain how some underlying forces enabled by the West's values in themselves could ultimately undermine multilateralism's current favorable environment.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. MULTILATERALISM'S BRITISH EXAMPLE

Contemporary history rarely considers the United Kingdom a successful multilateral endeavor. Arguably, however, Britain seems like a singular nation rather than a multilateral effort among the old kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Wales because this multilateral endeavor was so successful. Since 1707, Great Britain has been a united nation under one government. Until Union, however, British politics and society were an ongoing exercise in multilateralism in its purest form. Britain's path from becoming the United Kingdom in 1603 and its later national Union in 1707 and beyond demonstrate the characteristics of Western multilateralism's most profound and effective effort; moreover, the insight of its history allows Britain to be a successful benchmark to compare other multilateral efforts' successes and failures and more importantly the circumstances that allow these efforts' to succeed or fail.³¹

A. TOGETHERNESS BY CIRCUMSTANCE

The death of Queen Elizabeth Tudor without an heir in 1603 placed the British Isles in a unique and volatile situation. England, the more advanced and dominant power on the islands, found itself ruled by the king of its Scottish rival through dynastic succession, the result of an arranged marriage that occurred roughly a century before. King James VI, from Scotland's House of Stuart, inherited England on Elizabeth's death.³²

Part of this strange turn of events owed to Elizabeth's own decrees. In order to secure her own claim to the crown in a fractious and unquiet age, she had banned any literature or public actions on the topic of potential heirs lest any of the candidates turn out to have a better claim than her own. After all, one the decisive elements that put Elizabeth—a woman!—on the throne in the first place was her Protestant faith.³³ She and

³¹ Leanda de Lisle, *After Elizabeth: The Rise of James of Scotland and the Struggle for the Throne of England* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005) 3–7.

³² *Ibid.*, 3–7.

³³ John Guy, "The Tudor Age: 1485–1603," in *The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain*, ed. Kenneth Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 266–267.

her supporters had important reasons to nip any rival in the royal bud. In fact, there were many who thought Elizabeth's cousin, Mary, Queen of Scots, had a more legitimate claim to the throne; however, Mary was Catholic and had an unsettling affinity for France. England meant to remain Protestant and aloof from its largest Continental rival.³⁴

But out of this same turmoil arose—in the unlikely person of James VI—the first hopes for a multilateral stability:

Courtiers feared that the price of Elizabeth's security during her life would be civil war and foreign invasion on her death—but the future was also replete with possibilities. A new monarch drawn from a weak field would need to acquire widespread support to secure his or her position against rivals. That meant opening up the royal purse: there would be gifts of land, office and title.³⁵

Indeed, England was a kingdom not ruled by a centralized bureaucracy capable of efficient and authoritarian enforcement many continental nations exercised, but instead was a system of enticing cooperation from its English subjects, parliament, and nobles. At the time of Elizabeth's death the coronation of an Englishman with questionable credentials, and thus vulnerable to usurpation, could only mean treacherous times at worst or expensive effort to buy off potential royal contenders at best. Simply, the fear of worse alternatives and the attraction of a way to avoid those fears made James a preferred option upon Elizabeth's death; any other option would have been too destabilizing.³⁶ In the event, in these awkward times, meant that compromise, tolerance, and other Anglo-Saxon values became attractive options. James had no hope of consolidating his rule with any other method than attraction—not only to attract support from his new English subjects, but to draw closer the Scots as well, who justly feared being victim of English hegemony within this new United Kingdom.³⁷

By 1707, England, Scotland, and Wales had been under a single dynasty for more than a hundred years. They remained distinct though interconnected in many ways.

³⁴ Lisle, *After Elizabeth*, 3–7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 6–7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 7–18.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3–7.

Scotland, in particular, stubbornly held to the prerogatives of an autonomous power long after the politics had shifted real power to London. While some laws applied to the overall United Kingdom, the Scots had their own legal system and legislature.³⁸

On the other hand, the Scots around Edinburgh and other lowland population centers had become more like their English neighbors than their rural highland countrymen. This development is to be expected considering the economic interdependence between the English and Scottish subjects along with the proliferation of printing presses, abundantly available English books that regularly ended up in Scotland, and the myriad mass-produced goods that circulated throughout the kingdoms. Scottish tradesmen had become attracted to opportunity in the prosperous South and Englishmen had benefit to be gained from trading and collaborating with their northern neighbors. Additionally, the lack of any significant warfare between the kingdoms benefited the security of Englishmen and Scot alike—to say nothing of the trade and commercial bonds; between 1630 and 1680 alone, the monarchs tax revenue had more than doubled.³⁹

Then another childless monarch, now Queen Anne of the Stuart dynasty, once again threatened the same chaos of succession dreaded a century earlier.⁴⁰ England and Scotland now had even more to lose. Queen Ann's situation thus led the Parliament of Westminster to pass the Act of Union that linked the three kingdoms into one Great Britain under one Protestant ruler with a common legislature and free trade system. For many, Union marked the least bad of the available—or conceivable—options:

The politicians in London had feared that unless a formal, political union with Scotland was cemented, as distinct from the existing dynastic union, the country might opt on the death of poor childless Queen Anne for James Edward Stuart, her exiled Roman Catholic half-brother, instead of agreeing, as the English and Welsh had already done, to import a new

³⁸ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 11–12.

³⁹ Ibid, 11–12.; John Morrill, “The Stuarts: 1603–1688,” in *The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain*, ed. Kenneth Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 298.

⁴⁰ Colley, *Britons* 11–12.

Protestant dynasty from Hanover. A full, legislative union was the only solution London was prepared to consider.⁴¹

The English were more powerful than their northern neighbors yet still sought a solution amenable to the people of both kingdoms, a testament to the multilateral spirit of an emerging united country. Without question, however, it was English desire for stability, prosperity, and security on the island—rather than lofty ideals or any abiding affection for the Scots—that impelled England to seek a multilateral arrangement with Scotland.⁴²

The compromise was profound for the day. Rather than trying to strong-arm the Scots into compliance, or merely allowing a Stuart clamant to entice the Scots to break away, most likely amid devastating warfare, the English decided it was better to grant the Scots more influence within a consolidated government. Now a non-English people, who had been enemies in the past, would have the power to influence English policy on English soil through a common parliament. Thus, the English actually sacrificed some of their own sovereignty to the Scottish; the price of unity and security was paid for in the currency of sovereignty.⁴³

B. PROTESTANT UNITY AND THE CATHOLIC THREAT

While English *raison d'état* clearly justifies the 1707 Act of Union at the national level, yet to be explained is how this union of politics translated into a common British identity and why the inhabitants of the new Great Britain actually became a united people who accepted and embraced this multilateral arrangement. After all, a degree of common identity, togetherness, and sincerely shared values are important; without it, any union is merely a conceptual design waiting to be ripped apart as soon as circumstance provides more centrifugal forces over that of centripetal ones.⁴⁴ In order for multilateralism to

⁴¹ Ibid, 12.

⁴² Ibid, 11–12.

⁴³ Ibid, 11–12.

⁴⁴ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, xiv.

work over time, British unity needed to be a process of habits and motivations that reinforced it against circumstance's future friction.

This rise of "Britishness," like most transitions of identity and togetherness, did not occur overnight in Great Britain but is the result of various forces at play that influenced the actions, beliefs, and essence of the emerging British identity. This process of a people not only viewing themselves differently—like a Scotsman seeing himself as British—but viewing a former foe as one of their own brethren was a process that began with the one commonality they had, Protestantism, and was reinforced by the common threat they feared: Catholic power.⁴⁵

A poem, a chant, and unofficial battle cry, James Thomson wrote the following lines in 1740; the poem's nationalist allure continues in Britain to this day at myriad events ranging from concert halls to sporting events:

When Britain first at heaven's command,
Arose from out the azure main,
This was the charter of the land.
And guardian angels sung this strain:
'Rule Britannia, rule the waves,
Britons never will be slaves.'⁴⁶

While Thomson's words—specifically "Britons never will be slaves"⁴⁷—do not speak the issue of Catholicism explicitly, once the threat and antagonisms of the Papacy, France, and Spain are taken into account, the connection between slavery and Catholicism becomes clearer.

British fear of Catholic rule was no mere ghost story conjured up by those in love with the idea of British unity. Not only were Spain and France competitors within the colonial world system at the time—and thus rivals to Britain in trade and conquests—but Jacobite invasions, military expeditions led by Catholic Stuart claimants with the military assistance of France and Spain, threatened not only hinterlands of Scotland but London itself. In 1708, 1715, and 1745, Jacobite invasions landed on Scottish soil and moved south. While these invasions were ultimately defeated, they along with other potential

⁴⁵ Colley, *Britons*, 11–54.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

invasions in 1717, 1719, 1720–1721, 1743, and 1759 were decisive in forming British identity and appreciation of the Union at both the elite the common level. Because the Counter-Reformation was still visiting persecution on common people throughout continental Europe, these persecuted Protestants brought stories of their hardships to the British Isles after many of them were exiled. As expected these stories found prominent place in British newspapers and such publicity had a profound impact on Britain's eighteenth century Protestant *Zeitgeist*. An article from the *Weekly Medley* in 1729 gives an example of what Britain understood of Catholic rule:

Our letters from Paris make mention of the renewing of persecution of our Protestant brethren, which they pursue with such warmth, that their children are forc'd from them, and some put to nunneries, and others to monasteries, there to be brought up in the Romish religion, and everyone forbid, upon pain of death, to follow the light of his conscience; all marriages celebrated by Protestant clergymen, within these four years, to be dissolved, and the children to be declared bastards, unless these marriages are a second time solemniz'd according to the rites of the Romish Church.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the fear of Catholic rule and the attraction of mutual security overrode previous concerns that both Scotsmen and Englishmen had at the 1707 Act of Union. The compromise of 1707 actually assured the security and the redefined sovereignty of England and Scotland, whatever each side ceded to the other. This eighteenth century British circumstance is a theme that occurs constantly in multilateralism in general; new multilateral institution, often wrought of mutually antagonistic partners forced into a multilateral bargain by outside forces, ends up achieving stability, security, and prosperity.

With common security achieved among the English, the Welsh, and the Scottish, the British could refocus their combined efforts. For the British, the effectiveness of the unity facilitated an empire great enough to match the individual ambitions of Englishmen and Scotsmen, commoner and elite alike. Blessed with riches, and more importantly a profitable role and opportunity within this empire, British power and prosperity therefore became a beneficial centripetal force to their multilateral bargain; whatever was good for the English and Scotsmen individually was often good for the British Empire and vice-versa.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 24.

C. EMPIRE, PROFITS, SCOTTISH AMBITION, AND MUTUAL ELEVATION

One characteristic that the people of Scotland and England had in common, besides Protestantism, was the value of trade and profits. This entrepreneurial trait can be traced to the same circumstances that gave Britain its essence: it was an island maritime power and its governing system allowed self-interested individuals to advance themselves and keep fruits of their labor. The British way of governance granted individuals the motivation to better their lives through trade and developed an early capitalist spirit. Also convenient, the accommodating relationship between landed nobility and upwardly mobile tradesmen became a mutually beneficial relationship between trade and state. Landed nobles benefited from their relationship with capitalists via loans and business connections; the state and nobles alike benefited from taxes and the access credit from tradesmen; and tradesmen benefited from the state's ability to provide security and stability, which, in turn, was enhanced by economic prosperity. The system was working out for everyone from the Scottish tradesmen to the English landed class:⁴⁹

Great Britain was forged in the way that it was after 1707, and to the extent that it was, in part because different classes and interest groups came to see this newly invented nation as a usable resource, as a focus of loyalty which would also cater to their own needs and ambitions. From patriotism, men and women were able to anticipate profits of some kind.⁵⁰

Another reason for the stability and cohesion of this multilateral system to remain in place was credit itself. Because money loaned was money lost if it was not paid back but money paid back with interest was profit, solid law and order from the state was perpetually beneficial. Contracts had to retain their integrity—that is, be enforceable and enforced.⁵¹ Therefore, everyone had an interest in the credit system being effective and stable. After all, if there was no proper rule of law, and people who had the potential to lend money believed they would not profit, those who needed credit would have no access. Thus, the multilateral system of British law between former rivals possessed an

⁴⁹ Ibid, 55–67.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 55.

⁵¹ Basil Williams, *The Whig Supremacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939) 260.

attraction of prosperity, beneficial order, and the potential for each individual citizen of the United Kingdom to make future profits. Signally, prosperity through credit allowed everyone, regardless of ancestry, to prosper from the system. Moreover, this prosperity was not based on a zero-sum economic system, but instead a fostered a lively exchange on the basis of mutual benefit open to any man who could buy, trade, or bargain his way in. In the end, this economic order was something Scotsmen and Englishmen alike sought to protect.⁵²

The epoch of colonialism only accelerated these trends—and the profits that went with them. Now the state had the army and navy and could provide security at home and at many places abroad; colonial holdings allowed tradesmen the opportunity to import raw materials from colonized lands and manufacture finished products at home to then sell them domestically and abroad. The state collected taxes from those profits; with more money the state could increase its military capability and thus open up more foreign markets with further conquest. Thus, the state and tradesmen alike had motivation to feed the British colonial system bringing empires' benefit to all of British society.⁵³

As the British Empire grew to astounding proportions and colonized holdings as far as Asia, India, the Middle East, and the Americas, it needed all the talented tradesmen, soldiers, sailors, and politically astute persons to run, maintain, and expand its empire it could find. The state's demand for talent and manpower afforded advancement opportunity for most of British society, especially the ambitious Scotsman. In the free-floating and self-adjusting nature of British society, men found attractive roles for themselves in the expanding empire and the same imperial system had a demand for their ambition—effectively outsourcing their upward mobility or at least directing it outward, away from the domestic English establishment.⁵⁴

This self-adjusting system also allowed higher degrees of meritocracy, in contrast to other European *anciens regimes*, to provide both motivation and manpower for the

⁵² Colley, *Britons*, 66–67.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 56–72.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 55–102. Christopher Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707–1977* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), 96–99.

British Empire's growth. Many affluent English, with plenty of opportunity where they already were, decided to coordinate their foreign endeavors from bustling London. On the other hand, this arrangement afforded many Scotsman, even though they were experiencing increased opportunity in their native homeland as well, to seek adventure, potential wealth, and elevated personal prestige by supporting the British Empire's military and commercial endeavor's overseas. While many Englishmen did seek the same opportunities overseas as their Scottish counterparts, the opportunity to benefit oneself while also supporting the Empire was most exploited by Scotsmen, many of whom had humble beginnings thus the relational improvement of the own conditions made personal contribution to the Empire abroad most attractive to those lacking affluent backgrounds. In other words, the colonial endeavor also facilitated a certain multilateral amalgamation at home, while encouraging a certain loyal entrepreneurship abroad.⁵⁵

While the British colonial and proto-capitalist system clearly benefited traders, it was the fact that so much of British society was part of this occupation that made the system attractive and popular. Not only did one in five British families seek their livelihood through trade, but those tradesmen and other interested parties like farmers and manufacturers all relied on the domestic order and international access of the Empire to increase their own profits.⁵⁶ There simply was enough benefit gained by enough people within this system to ensure its popular buy-in and multilateral momentum into the future, so much so that it became habit and part of the essence of every English, Welsh, and Scottish citizen within the island to benefit from and contribute to British civilization—and accordingly—past cultural divides and other barriers to multilateralism became less relevant.⁵⁷

Perhaps the most telling indicator of multilateral attraction was how Scots so widely rejected Jacobitism after the mid-1700s. Where in the first half of the century the potential of Scottish independence had appeal, and the attraction of Catholic rule was still strong among many in Scotland's highland clans, the growing prosperity of Scots

⁵⁵ Colley, *Britons*, 55–102.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 56.; Rosalind Mitchison, *A History of Scotland*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 345–351.

⁵⁷ Colley, *Britons*, 72–86.

consigned the dwindling but persistent Stuart claimants to irrelevancy in their historic stronghold. The threat of war and instability, and thus the weakening of the overall British system for the sake of narrow Scottish identity politics, was simply no longer attractive to most Scotsmen—even if they happened to be Catholic!⁵⁸

Interestingly, even those clans who had long sworn their fealty to the Jacobite opposition, ultimately found their way “home” to Britain. Fortunately for these past traitors, and for the British Empire, the demand for effective soldiers, military officers, and other skills abroad forced the Empire to value their service and gave these recent enemies the opportunity to redeem themselves, contribute to the British cause, and most importantly, gain wealth. The attraction of mutually beneficial profits among past enemies again became a powerful attraction to British multilateralism, so much so that Englishmen such as John Wilkes, a devoted anti-Scot, used the elevation of Scotsmen within the British empire as a core element of his political demagoguery to attract English populist support for his own elections. The remnant separatism was popular for a while, particularly among the milieu that was not profiting directly from imperial expansion and that, as a result, was apt to regard the Scots as predators of jobs and status. Ultimately, however, Wilkes’s numbers dwindled and Britons came to think of themselves as a diverse but somehow unified nation.⁵⁹

D. BRITISH AMERICANS: FEAR AND ATTRACTION LOST

The British multilateral system by the time of the American Revolution had become a nation at first because of the fear of Catholic power, foreign threats, and domestic instability, but the attraction came from the domestic stability and profits enhanced by being the greatest empire of its time. Importantly, all these achievements of power, wealth, and prestige originated from circumstances of female monarchs dying without heirs and the design of this powerful system was produced not in times of resolute strength, but from times of weakness, and the circumstance of those weak times demanded compromise, tolerance, and unity. Unfortunately for the Empire, Britain’s

⁵⁸ Ibid, 72–86.; Mitchison, *A History of Scotland*, 341–347.

⁵⁹ Colley, *Britons*, 118–134.

power through multilateral unity had limits. The American Revolution demonstrated how fear and attraction were double-edged swords to British multilateralism, particularly in the colonial periphery.

After the Seven Years War, 1756–1763, the British government found itself victorious over its French enemy in the New World but also found itself in enough debt to absorb five-eighths of its annual revenue in interest payments alone. In order to alleviate the war's tax burden, Parliament had to raise taxes and determined that subjects living the colonies needed to pay for their own defense. To British colonists in America the tax scheme looked like a demand for more central control—a kind of forcible attraction—while the French threat, and its inherent fear, appeared to be on the wane. In other words, both fear and attraction were at their ebb, which means the multilateral unity had little to sustain it. The result was the American Revolution.⁶⁰

Fear and attraction was also a prominent feature on the British end. Closer to home, the war put Britain on a war footing with France and Spain, two formidable Continental foes that presented an existential threat to London—while the American colonies clamored to retain their tax breaks and greater lawmaking autonomy. On top of this, while the profits generated from the Americas were significant, the Empire's most lucrative profits came from India and thus the Empire's real profit machine only became less secure with increased military commitment to the Americas. Essentially, the fear of an invasion on the British homeland, and the lowering attractiveness of holding on to the American colonies compared to further benefits elsewhere were not conducive to the British holding their formerly British American subjects within their multilateral system. In this sense, then, dwindling fear and attraction cut both ways at the fabric of British multilateralism.⁶¹

Still, the American Revolution notwithstanding, British multilateralism must be noted as Western multilateralism's most long-lasting, profound, and successful effort.

⁶⁰ John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990) 202–204.; Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 590.

⁶¹ Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed*, 202–204.; Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause*, 590.

Fear and attraction explain both the success and the one major failure that began in 1776; the results of fear and attraction create habits and norms that deepen the multilateral effort and make it something that overcome and lesson future centrifugal forces. In Britain's case that system worked so well that it became something to defend over original differences within its original members. The reason British multilateralism remained—and remains—successful is because it remained relevant and beneficial to its English, Welsh, and Scottish members.⁶²

⁶² Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 3–22.

III. POWER POLITICS' RISE AND EUROPE'S ETHICAL DILEMMA

In contrast to the British multilateral experience, continental Europe's record from the 16th century to the close of World War I was more or less constant conflict caused by power politics. Why so? What drove rulers constantly to choose war over peaceful means of advancing their countries' interest? After all, wars are expensive, messy, and bring risk of the rulers' demise. Moreover, Europe's staunch Christianity—with its famous pacifism—could have been expected to temper the aggressive motivations of European rulers and perhaps even inspire them to multilateralism within the broad context of a shared faith. While some elite thinkers of this turbulent time desired peace—and an international order to facilitate it—the circumstances of this time and place made any grand alternatives from power politics unlikely except in very specific circumstances.

Additionally, this was the zero-sum epoch of Europe. Land meant food, and food meant people, taxes, and goods for trade. People, in turn, meant armies and therefore land meant power, prestige, security, but land is a zero-sum commodity. Also, Europe never had its own capitalist enlightenment like the British where trade and business was a joining activity of perpetual self-reinforcing interest of aristocrat, tradesmen, producer, and government. While the British system had these things, and therefore the old kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Wales and all of their assorted subgroups had the motivational forces of profit—not to mention Protestant solidarity—Europe was a mixture of feudal and state systems more centered around hierarchal orders of rent-seeking where those with power took from those without power with little concession if any. It was this zero-sum Continental environment that is partially to blame for Europe's inability to give its leaders the fears and attractions necessary for multilateralism to work; simply, prosperity, peace, and the civilized rule of law necessary to bring benefits to all in Britain were the friends of multilateralism; on the other hand, zero-sum competition in Europe—domestically and internationally—was the enemy of multilateralism and was the friend of competition and power politics.⁶³

⁶³ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 55–67.; Alan Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1918* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957) xix–xxxiii.

The motivations for the age of power politics in Europe were fear and attraction—and likewise the forces that temporarily restrained power politics only at certain periods, namely after the French Revolution, and offered alternative international systems were also the fears and attractions of objective self-seeking rulers. Also, Europe’s path through enlightenment and modernity during this period affected European society at all levels and the enlightenment not only changed political circumstances, but the values of all Europeans as well. Therefore, rulers who lived in those developing circumstances made decisions based on self-interested fears and attractions created from those same circumstances. The opportunity for a peaceful multilateral system was also tied to those circumstances, because national rulers were ultimately what allowed multilateral arrangements to succeed or fail in the first place.⁶⁴

A. FAITH, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND RULERS

The European Enlightenment was another force that transformed the nature of international conflict. Whether it was the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the rise of science, or the general changing ideas of God and man’s essence in the minds of commoner and elite alike, the Enlightenment had a nuanced but cumulatively profound effect on the actions and motivations of all in Europe. In the 16th and early 17th centuries the Enlightenment particularly began to change the roles of church and rulers.

Immanuel Kant perhaps best defines Enlightenment as simply *sapere aude*, or “dare to know.” The proliferation of the printed word was the hallmark. The proliferation of print and other communications led man to question every old thought and everything was open to debate, provided a leader or institution was not so offended as to order the questioner’s imprisonment, exile, or execution. At the same time, crowned heads picked and chose among various opinions, religious and otherwise, to legitimize their rule and actions. For example, some enlightened opinions held kings were subordinate only to God, while others more conservatively viewed kingdoms as the Church’s daughters. If a king was directly legitimized by God, and not the Church, he could act against the

⁶⁴ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 6–7; Michael Burleigh, *Earthly Powers* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), Kindle edition, chap. 1.

Church's will. Additionally, given the religious fragmentations caused by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, a king needed some philosophy or rationale, whether religious or worldly, to assure him that what he was doing was moral and right and that he was, indeed, the legitimate ruler of his regime. Not surprisingly, proponents of the various philosophies were all too willing to elevate the authority of monarchs in their writings so that their particular teachings were more likely to be accepted—and remunerated.⁶⁵

Amid the reconsiderations of the relationship of rulers and ruled to God, the church, and each other, religious schisms led to war. The Wars of Religion, 1569–1594, forced elite and commoner alike to choose sides, and the conflicts failed to resolve themselves geographically within the borders of kingdoms, not least because adherents to the “losing” creed or view inspired their self-appointed saviors in neighboring kingdoms to battle on their behalf. The only certainty was future conflict, change, and a re-alignment of life in Europe at all levels of society. Therefore, rulers in this age had to choose among divergent paths. Some chose the old ways, hoping to garner the benefit of papal power, and more or less continued on the feudal path in terms of political and social organization; however, others sought stability in a reduced dependency on the Church, made the religious institutions within their country more subordinated to the crown, and adopted a Machiavellian emphasis on strengthening the state.⁶⁶

Europe's new emerging states controlled more of their institutions and were less interdependent with the church; therefore, these states developed bureaucracies to fill the void. Not only that, but the nature of man and monarch changed in states. A king who was no longer reliant on divine (or at least church) approval also could not count anymore on the church as an absolute source of legitimacy and Monarchs now had to start compromising with landowning and other useful subjects to maintain loyalty and compliance. Some men began to have more rights, and kings became limited in their

⁶⁵ Burleigh, *Earthly Powers*, chap. 1.

⁶⁶ Ibid, chap. 1.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 6–12.

authority; monarchs had shed the Church's authority only to have their own domestic authority over their subjects become less absolute.⁶⁷

At the same time, the multilateral European order, championed by so many cleric-philosophers and often associated with the church, was weakened and state-centered conflict on the Machiavellian model became the norm because states were no longer restrained, or protected, by Papal politics. Multilateral security at this point was impossible because the multilateral Church was increasingly sidelined.⁶⁸

B. THE THIRTY YEARS WAR, THE RISE OF STATES, AND A NEW DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM

The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648, began as a localized conflict but turned into a European-wide war. The war began as an effort by the Catholic Habsburg dynasty to regain its lost Protestant possessions but the increasingly Machiavellian nature of European politics led nearly every nation to enter the conflict at one point or another, and the war's religious justifications gave way to rulers' political ambitions. France's willingness to fight against other Catholic states—because political opportunities proved more advantageous to France than idealistic and religious loyalties—is but one example of this transformation.⁶⁹ On the one hand, the war cemented the principle of "*cuius regio, eius religio*," which had been articulated but by no means fully accepted at the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, and ushered in an age of great-power politics in Europe along largely Machiavellian lines. On the other hand, the logic and experience of this age sowed the seeds, over the course of a century or so, of the next European multilateral experiment.

Because the victors of the Thirty Years War were mostly states rather than feudal dynasties, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had more to do with entrenching the power of states to do as they pleased within their borders without the intrusion of the Church. This new way of operating was akin to a fences-between-neighbors policy, recognizing that all

⁶⁷ Burleigh, *Earthly Powers*, chap. 1.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 9–12.

⁶⁸ Burleigh, *Earthly Powers*, chap. 1.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 9–12.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 8–12.

states were sovereign and their rulers were equal or at least equally entitled to rule over their respective territories to the best of their abilities. However, peace did not follow because competition between these states still existed. Indeed, states' ability to organize their internal affairs actually intensified the competition because their new capability to exploit exclusively their resources allowed more military capability. Historian Charles Tilly stated it best: "[W]ar made the state, and the state made war."⁷⁰

This new international system brought forth aggressive power politics and a new kind of diplomacy. States' goals in this new diplomatic system were to ensure their sovereignty by making alliances with other states to counter the power of present and potential rivals. In an environment where being alone was dangerous because isolation meant potential foes could team up and share the benefits of your destruction, it became more important for states to have friends, or at least allies, even if they had nothing else in common beyond a given rival. For example, France's Louis XIV once pursued alliances with Sweden and Muslim Turkey to discourage Russia from interfering with his ambitions of hand-picking a successor in Poland.⁷¹

The new diplomacy was akin to a chess game, with each nation seeking present and future advantages for itself. Thus, it became advantageous to have diplomats who could manipulate the alignment of alliances to isolate future foes. In this system, the power a nation possessed determined the techniques of their diplomats; a powerful nation like France would create a series of alliances that would isolate one nation and prevent it from having allies so it could invade that weaker and lonely state at a time of French choosing. On the other hand, weaker states formed alliances to counter stronger nations to attempt to secure their own sovereignty.⁷²

⁷⁰ Ibid, 10–13.; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in New Europe," in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, expanded ed. edited by. Sean Lynn–Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2001) 101.

⁷¹ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 12, 31.

⁷² Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 7–14.

Not only did this system lead to wars for no aim other than increasing power, but the competition between states led rulers to demand ever more resources from their nations:

From 1618 until 1721, a long series of raging wars changed the rank order of European states by exhausting some and exalting others. Virtually all of the major dynastic rivalries, religious differences, the drawing of borders, possession of cities and fortresses, trade routes and colonies, and ultimately the destinies of kingdoms and empires were decided by the use of armed force in war. At the beginning of the century, a European battle might involve as few as 25,000 troops on both sides. Within a few decades, France alone created an army of 400,000.... Only they [Great Power States] could defend themselves from external attack. Only they could convene peace settlements.⁷³

This environment made diplomats merely a part of war rather than war being part of international diplomacy; all that a state could possess or secure was based on the might of its armies and its alliances. Thus, the prospects of restraint or common security were not feasible or attractive to Europe's various rulers. Peace simply had no force behind it.

French machinations in the War of Spanish Succession best highlight this environment. The War of Spanish Succession, waged between 1702 and 1714, started when the Spanish monarchy found itself without an heir to the throne; predictably the French Bourbon dynasty could not pass up the opportunity to bring Spanish lands into its possession. Before France could strike to its south, however, it had to secure its northern border. Louis XIV sent his army into the Netherlands to dissuade interference from other European nations by reminding his neighbors through his demonstration of martial force who Europe's hegemon was.⁷⁴

This strong-arm technique backfired to the extent that the Grand Alliance was formed, a coalition of the Netherlands, Austria, Prussia, and England. After amassing a ground force of nearly 70,000 soldiers, the Grand Alliance defeated the French at Blenheim in 1704, Ramillies in 1706, and in several successive battles. Eventually, the French were forced to give up their Spanish ambitions and renounce all of their conquests

⁷³ Ibid, 7–8, 18.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 13–14, 18.

east of the Rhine River among other concessions in the 1713–1714 Treaty of Utrecht. At this point Europe recognized the power of weaker states combining to balance the power of a threatening hegemon.⁷⁵

While the thwarting of French domination was a major achievement of the Grand Alliance, it was the creation of a new conceptual force that transformed the nature of Western politics: peace enabled by the force of balancing. Even King Louis XIV embraced this conceptual power—despite his defeat!—and viewed it as a potential for peace. As for the rest of Europe, the balancing of power to prevent the domination of one state over others began to offer an attraction of potential security through multilateral means and—more importantly—all nations saw the feasibility of enjoying peace’s benefit while simultaneously defending their sovereignty. Perhaps peace could occur within, and actually be reinforced by Machiavellian urges if aggression was deterred by balancing and peace was indeed the interest of the state? In other words, the fears and attractions of rulers could perhaps align with peace objectively—rationally, self-interestedly—rather than altruistically. This balancing allowed durable and widespread peace to become a possibility, especially when a costly war loomed fresh in rulers’ memories.⁷⁶

To be sure, this tentative enthusiasm for peace was still centered on the power that could be brought to bear by states because, as Frederick the Great would opine, “negotiations without arms produce as little impression as musical scores without instruments.”⁷⁷ Thus, this short window for multilateral peace was doomed to fail. Rulers still had interest in using the state’s apparatus to internally build their power, and the fluid and volatile environment of European politics—which had monarchs dying without heirs and various states’ powers waxing and waning—still presented opportunities too good to be passed on by ambitious rulers. In other words, and despite the lessons learned from the Thirty Years War and the War of Spanish Succession, rulers’ fears and attractions still made multilateralism merely an altruistic desire rather than tool to be used beneficially to states’ interest.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Ibid, 18.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 18.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 18.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 18–20.

The Machiavellian trend continued in 1740 when Frederick the Great decided that the opportunity to conquer Silesia was too good to be missed because English, French, and Russian antagonisms would counterbalance each other and the likelihood of them entering a conflict seemed low because, as Frederick incorrectly surmised, the Great Powers would not risk war with one another over tiny Silesia. Frederick therefore decided:

All this leads to the conclusion that we must occupy Silesia before the winter and then negotiate. When we are in possession we can negotiate with success.⁷⁹

Here the conceived motivations of balancing actually contributed to aggression; it was Frederick's hope that the fear of war between Great Powers would work out in his favor and the invasion Austrian Silesia would be an easy acquisition. Much to Prussia's surprise the nature of Europe at this time made Frederick's sophisticated calculations a disaster to both his ambitions and any hope for peace based on balancing. The Great Powers intervened to enforce the pre-existing balance, which did not accord such size or mass to Prussia. Thus, much of Europe found itself thrown into the War of Austrian Succession lasting from 1740 to 1748 for myriad reasons, few or which had anything to do with Silesia in the first place. European politics was still based on power and therefore balancing was just another technique of power politics. Rulers still feared the rising power of other nations and were still attracted to the security that having more power provided.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Ibid, 18.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 18–20.

C. RESTRAINT'S PENDULUM: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION'S AFTERMATH TO WORLD WAR I

Throughout the 18th century, whether it was the Seven Years War or France and Spain's later entrance into the American Revolution to harm British interest, Europe was fully embroiled in power politics, abetted by the efficient war making apparatus of the bureaucratized European nation-state. However, the competitive nature of European power politics was leading continental Europe toward a new reality—one that found rulers not only threatened by invasions from other states, but also threatened by a force that presented new and powerful fears to European rulers—revolutions.⁸¹

By the late 18th century French sovereign debt from the Seven Years War and the American Revolution, in addition to the costs of maintaining its hegemonic power, began to weaken the privileged first and second estates. The first estate was the monarch, the family of the monarch, and the clergy within the state; the second estate consisted of the aristocracy. While many nations of Europe's old regimes had debt, the French elites sought to mitigate this debt while simultaneously maintaining the loyalty of the second estate by increasing taxes on the third estate—everybody else, from shopkeepers to lawyers to bureaucrats to farmers. In order to compensate the third estate for the new tax burden, the monarch granted his commoner subjects more liberties.⁸²

The French state also became more centralized. In order for the French monarch to keep his aristocratic second estate in line and loyal, he relieved the second estate of any meaningful roles in the kingdom by luring them to Versailles to enjoy a good life of court politics that mostly consisted of social gatherings. Therefore, the actual running of the government was left to more educated and competent specialist within the third estate. Therefore, the running of the French state's day-to-day affairs was largely executed by the third estate; however, the third estate was exposed to the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. When Rousseau concept of a social contract between state and people, and thus the idea that man is an individual with a stake in, and right under the state, the increased taxed burden on the third estate to reduce debt began to create a dangerous

⁸¹ Ibid, 18–22.

⁸² Tocqueville, *The Old Regime*, 22–41, 120–137.

passion. When that passion was empowered by a relatively liberal and civil rule of peasants, which allowed them to own land, pay taxes, and therefore acutely feel the brunt of bad financial governance, the French commoners decided to mobilize and ultimately unleashed their frustrations against their privileged rulers. More than merely a change of rulers, the French Revolution was a change of systems that successfully toppled aristocratic rule; this presented a new threat to ruling elites and had an enormous impact on the whole international European order.⁸³

The rest of Old Europe's privileged rulers did not initially perceive the internal nature of the French Revolution as a threat to their own sovereignty but instead focused on increasing their own power through conquest and took advantage of the vacuum leftover from the French hegemon being destroyed internally. However, with a new enlightened ideology inflamed by hatred of aristocratic privilege, the French Revolution ended up being a bigger threat to European states than had ever existed previously thanks to revolutionary fervors across all of Europe's commoners. The situation became a nightmare thanks to Napoleonic invasions greatly enabled by those same passions.⁸⁴

The French threat—military and social—was finally met by a coalition of state rulers determined to uphold the aristocratic status quo and ultimately prevailed in 1815 with the final defeat of Napoleon. As often occurs after brutal wars, the forces of Old Europe desired restraint through diplomatic means; this time however, any new arrangement had to consider the threat of revolutions. Because the whole French disaster was initially caused by power politics, and thus the consequence of this led to the Revolution, Europe's Great Powers (Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) recognized the power of what Clausewitz would later classify as the people's passion.⁸⁵

The arming of large militaries made possible by the state's organization combined with enlightened and revolutionary sentiments among Europe's commoners did not make

⁸³ Ibid, 22–41, 120–137.; Ivan Berend, *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003) 5–31.

⁸⁴ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 50–53, 57.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 24–32.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 24–32.

a good combination. In other words, the combination of enlightenment, war's fiscal and social demands, and large numbers of commoners armed for those wars was no longer an attractive option to rulers given the potential of another revolution. Therefore, multilateral restraint had its first legitimate opportunity to overcome past Machiavellian temptations of aggression like that of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great.⁸⁶

As a result of the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont, the Great Powers (Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia) committed themselves to the final defeat of Napoleon and laid a diplomatic structure to prevent the upheaval's reoccurrence.⁸⁷ This structure, known as the Congress System, aimed to maintain a balance of power for the sake of preventing large wars and make popular revolutions less likely.⁸⁸ Although the formal structure of the Congress System quickly failed, its intent was carried on with the Concert of Europe (same original great powers with an aristocratic France included) and its intent was threefold.⁸⁹ First, it established the desire of the great powers to limit the mobilization of armies to protect the current social order.⁹⁰ Next, it established that nations should respect the right of their neighbors to take military defense measures; and finally, they held that issues of war should not be unilateral but diplomatically communicated throughout the Concert of Europe.⁹¹

For 50 years, the multilateral bargain had solid results, and wars were small and contained. The reasons for the Concert of Europe's success were threefold. First, the balancing of powers made any overly aggressive action by Great Powers unattractive because it could lead to a big war and enflame the peoples' passion. Second, Europe was generally balanced in power, and each nation was willing to work in concert with other powers to prevent the aggrandizement of any single nation; for example, France would work with its British historical foe in order to counter an aggressive action against Russia

⁸⁶ Ibid, 24–32.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 70.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 70.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 70–71.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 63–64.

⁹¹ Ibid, 70–71

and then work with Russia to hold Britain in check when required. In other words, the motivations of all nations to prevent aggrandizement of its neighbors made aggression diplomatically risky; at times this even motivated some nations like Russia to take a pass on territorial gains fearing it would frighten its neighbors into uniting against it.⁹²

However, the Concert's attraction to balance had a sinister element to it as well. The power balance in Europe was perhaps effective because it was satisfactory to the Great Powers, but the Great Powers alone. Part of the original plan put in place buffer states between Great Powers to keep from invading one another but the lesser powers found themselves being conquered. While the principle of balancing kept Great Powers from going to war, it should be considered that that the peace in this period was more likely due to the availability of low hanging fruit like weak European nations and non-European colonial expansion. In other words, the Great Powers feared each other and large wars in general, but had other paths of least resistance to increase their own power through conquest without risking a large war.⁹³

The third reason for the Concert's success was because the shared fear of peoples' passions among aristocrats affected the size of states' armies and every nation took extra caution not to arm its populace any more than necessary. Therefore, nations were not prepared for grand campaigns because they had small professional armies designed for small campaigns. Additionally, an aggressive increase of military force by any nation would only lead to an arms race by other nations and therefore leave all nations more vulnerable to revolutionary passions.⁹⁴

The ideal conditions that restrained European rulers were first lessened because of the strategic potential created by the Industrial Revolution and this change started a chain of circumstances that would ultimately make the Concert irrelevant. The Industrial Revolution enabled countries to finance, supply, and mobilize massive armies, and could do so under non-revolutionary conditions because nationalism was made possible by

⁹² Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 26–32.

⁹³ Ibid, 26–32.; Taylor, *The Struggle*, xxi–xxiii.

⁹⁴ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 30–32.

advances in mass communication, railroads, urbanization, mass politics, and overall higher interconnectedness of national societies.⁹⁵ Therefore, in order for a great power to maintain its relative power, it had to embrace the strategic potential of the Industrial Revolution for military purposes.⁹⁶

Rapid technical advances in weaponry along with the military applications of railroad and canned foods to move and sustain large armies, also forced rulers to forgo earlier mentalities of diplomatic restraint fearing they would be disadvantaged by rivals' industrial military growth. Nations now had two choices: increase their own power and keep up with the European arms race or not do so and become irrelevant in the international system at best, or be conquered at worst.⁹⁷

This fluid and rapid change in the great powers' industrial capability was prominent in the international game of politics. At the center of this game was Prussia because it sent a disturbing signal to the rest of Europe by demonstrating its aggressive nature and superior martial skills in 1870 when it soundly defeated France and occupied some of its territory.⁹⁸ From this impressive and swift defeat of French forces and the unification of a German nation a year later, the importance of checking Germany's power became a paramount realization to European powers. Where diplomatic efforts after the Napoleonic wars were centered on multilateral consultation between powers, the rise of Germany made Europe's international system centered on fear of German power; ironically, Germany itself feared the potential of its isolation and in turn continued to increase its own power. France, seeing first-hand that it was inferior to Germany, sought and eventually acquired an alliance with Russia.⁹⁹ Britain, also nervous of Germany's power, informally aligned with the French in 1906.¹⁰⁰ The choosing of strategic partners also benefitted Germany. The rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and in turn,

⁹⁵ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 55, 57–58.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁹⁸ Rothenberg, Gunther. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 303–304.

⁹⁹ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 72.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

Serbia's ties with Russia, allowed Germany to pick up an alliance with Austria-Hungary because they feared Russian invasion.¹⁰¹ Europe was "undoubtedly structured around two rival armed, and arming camps" and the principles of the Congress System and Concert of Europe had become irrelevant due to industrial military growth and the fear both sides of the German situation had of one another.¹⁰²

The structure of early 20th-century Europe alone did not plunge the great powers into war; however, the structure combined with rulers' logical fears of invasion and attractions to security did. Speaking of the situation, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke said it best: "Woe to him who applies the torch to Europe, who is the first to throw the match into the powder cask."¹⁰³ A small Serbian terrorist organization provided that match.¹⁰⁴

After the Black Hand assassinated the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and Russia came to Serbia's aid. Germany did not want Austria-Hungary to go to war but it did not matter; Austria-Hungary committed and Germany knew it could not stand idle and watch its only ally be quickly defeated by Russia. Once Berlin learned that Russia was mobilized to attack not only Austria-Hungary but also Germany—a decision made largely on Russian domestic politics and irrational Slavic nostalgia—the Kaiser no other option than to declare war on the Franco-Russian Alliance because that alliance could invade Germany from both east and west. From here the alliances used to balance Europe against the threat of Germany plunged it into World War I.¹⁰⁵

What must be noted is how the impact of the French Revolution, which made attractive consultation and restraint between nations, gave way to fears caused by the Industrial Revolution and the rise of Germany. All of Europe feared German power and

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 78–79.

¹⁰² Ibid, 73.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 32–40.; Taylor, *The Struggle*, 457–509.

¹⁰³ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 73.

¹⁰⁴ Walter Phelps Hall, *World Wars and Revolutions* (New York, NY: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1943) 33.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 34.

was not willing to risk their sovereignty to multilateral bargains of security and thus turned to secret military alliances; likewise, Germany had no trust in any institution outside its powerful military to maintain its own sovereignty and Western multilateralism once again proved irrelevant when it was needed most. In other words, the fears of Europe's various rulers made them more attracted to power and secret alliances for security than that of the Concert's multilateral security.¹⁰⁶

D. CONCLUSION

The conflict of ideas originated in the 16th century between Machiavelli and his more conciliatory rivals ran a 400-year competition for influence, but it was the fear of foreign invasion and the attraction of military power that dominated the decisions of Europe's rulers. Machiavelli essentially won; even when multilateral restraint did occur it was because of rational state interest and not because of any altruistic force originated from the spirit of Aquinas' multilateral disciples. Only the French Revolution allowed European rulers to seek common cause out of self-interest because the risk of revolution gave rulers their most powerful incentive for restraint.¹⁰⁷

Fear rooted in uprisings was only temporary and the Industrial Revolution created new social conditions. Afterwards, social conditions enabled nationalism to take hold and allay earlier fears of revolution from the third estate. The emergence of nationalism during the Industrial Revolution allowed those same commoners, who once struck such fear into rulers that inter-state competition was forced to restrain itself, to become a compliant resource, allowing states to increase military power and once again address their fear of invasion with the attraction of military power over that of multilateral security.¹⁰⁸

The rise of nationalism, industrial military potential, and German power readjusted European rulers' fears. They no longer considered the principles of the Concert of Europe to be beneficial, and the multilateral effort did not hold any relevance

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 34.

¹⁰⁷ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 3–40.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 3–40.

to rulers in the approach to World War I. Nations instead had to pursue their security by methods of the Machiavellian “beast.” World War I thus started, entrapped nations, and prolonged itself much in the same manner of the Thirty Years War, the War of Spanish Succession, and Europe’s myriad other conflicts motivated by power politics. The only difference between World War I and previous wars was not in rulers’ motivations and geopolitical tendencies—or any other adjustment in essential ideas about the basis of the European order—but rather the sheer killing power of industrial armies combined with nationalist passions. Thus, Europe once again was victim to circumstances based on its fears and attractions.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 3–40.; Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 69–83.

IV. EUROPE'S INTER-WAR PERIOD AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

World War I was a tragedy. It was a tragedy not merely because it ended roughly ten million lives and wrought destruction on cities and infrastructure, but because of the environment it created after its conclusion, one in which no way favored long lasting and effective multilateral solutions. Just as the Thirty Years War entrenched the objective state over the Church's altruistic multilateral institution, and the Industrial Revolution replaced revolutionary fervor with nationalism, World War I created a true sense of antagonism among Western men and turned the achievements of enlightenment, like nationalism and reason, into such impediments to cooperation as racism, jingoism, and revenge. Furthermore, these perverted forms of enlightenment made any effort of multilateral peace and security futile, if not impossible.¹¹⁰

The vengeance-laden integral nationalism that crawled out of the trenches in 1918 resonated long after the war. Despite Woodrow Wilson's increasingly lonely quest for a post-national order, national identities became *the* salient distinction between good and bad, right and wrong, and of superior or inferior men, races, and cultures. Whether it was French dislike of Germans for the destruction wrought on their land and people, or the German nationalists' hate of Jews as a coping mechanism to explain why the superior *Kultur* failed to overcome its Great War enemies, the strength of nationalism during the interwar period formed for many Europeans an attraction to primordial and emotional social instincts over any civilizing forces of peace and prosperity. Therefore, the interwar period was unsuitable for multilateralism—even with democratic governance in most of the major players—because hate and other primitive social constructs made any civilizing force toward a common good or peaceful bargain between nations democratically unpopular and therefore unworkable.¹¹¹ The wages of this failure were World War II, the Holocaust, and the near obliteration of Europe.

¹¹⁰ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 48–52.; Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 1–5.

¹¹¹ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 100–106.; Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 97–106.

A. WOODROW WILSON, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND ALTRUISM'S ENDURING WEAKNESS

Established in 1919 by the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations focused on collective security and open diplomacy that pitted a distinctly 20th-century liberalism against the Machiavellian status quo.¹¹² Unfortunately, Machiavelli—or at least *realpolitik*—won. Wilson, and the United States for that matter, had nothing in common with the Europe or its leaders after the Great War. Where Europe had its infrastructure destroyed and its civilian populace exposed to total war, the United States had by and large avoided the domestic social repercussions of the war.¹¹³ As one French diplomat noted: “The old Europe that we had known in 1914...ceased to exist.”¹¹⁴ Europe was suffering from massive class, ethnic, and ideological conflicts—and sought answers to these problems in measures that diverged sharply from the altruistic supranationalism that Wilson espoused from the comfort of a powerhouse country largely untouched by war. Therefore, when Wilson put his original ideas for the League of Nations into play immediately following the war—altruistic and peace-seeking ideas along the lines of Aquinas’s disciples but in a more humanist rather than religious nature—European leaders (other than Vladimir Lenin) embraced them no further than was necessary to garner American support for their own ends, primarily funds for post-war recovery. Wilson wanted the League of Nations to be a body that would collectively stand up to aggression and support a common good based on his own unique version of early 20th century Kantian liberal values.¹¹⁵

However, Europe had liberal values of another kind; to them, liberalism was the empowerment of the state and the Machiavellian world was one suitable to Europe’s 19th century in that the free flow of competition between states—whether it be commercial or by war—was a naturally occurring continuum of events dictated by the rational interest

¹¹² United Nations, *History*, <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml> [accessed February 20, 2012].

¹¹³ Taylor, *The Struggle*, 566–568.; George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Kindle edition, chap. 10.

¹¹⁴ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 48, 58–60.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, 50–53.

of individual entities and not that of a centralized body like the Church or the arbitrary rule of aristocracy or monarchs.¹¹⁶ Wilson's more 20th-century liberalism was something entirely different, however, in that it sought the benefit of all through international collaboration rather than competition; Wilson's liberalism was also centered on parties satisfying their self-interest, but the means was one of paradox. Everybody had to sacrifice to something not their own to gain the collective benefits, and this mechanism likely seemed as crazy to other state leaders as ancient tribes sacrificing virgins so that the gods would provide bountiful crops. Wilson's liberalism was to an extent a matter of faith to humanity and man-made institutions. Signally, Wilson aimed to have all nations commit to a common good, sacrifice a degree of sovereignty and money in the name of achieving a lasting peace and follow an empowered League's collective direction with each nation's security ensured collectively by the five victorious states rather than by secret alliances. While British interest was more multilateral than France's—where the primary intention was to punish and weaken Germany—and other nations like Italy fell somewhere in the middle, Wilson's goal of creating an international order met insurmountable resistance in the end. By the time a much-diminished League took up its work, Wilson's altruistic aims of common security and common good were watered down by too many different nations' divergent, often irreconcilable self-interests. The League's arsenal for enforcing peace was practically limited to flowery rhetoric rather than firm commitments from members.¹¹⁷

European nations, like Wilson, wanted peace for peace's sake as well, but with the steep mountain of recovery ahead of them, they rationally focused on their narrow self-interest than the empowerment of the League. Whether this interest was articulated in terms of recovery or reparations, however, European nations needed the United States' money and power; therefore, they had to compromise to a degree in order to receive assistance from the Americans to rebuild their nations and check the power of a potentially resurgent Germany.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Andre Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (USA, University of Michigan Press, 1999), 1–4.

¹¹⁷ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 100–106.; Herring, *To Superpower*, chap. 10.

¹¹⁸ George Gill, *The League of Nations: From 1929 to 1946* (New York: Avery Publishing Group, 1996), 1–14.

While the normative principles of the League promoted equality, multilateral security, peace, and liberal ideals, the fact that the victors aggressively punished Germany and retained their own pre-war colonial holdings made the whole affair seem ridiculous considering the League's liberal rhetoric of "just and honorable relations between nations."¹¹⁹ However, this ambition only applied in reality to victorious states and not "nations"—people of an shared historical identity—that still remained under colonial rule of European powers; in other words, the League's most important members' actions made the League's normative rhetoric hypocritical to the fullest. The acme of rhetorical absurdity came when Wilson worked to defeat a proposed League provision to improve human and racial equality despite his earlier championing of a "war to make the world safe for democracy," "justice," and "equality of rights."¹²⁰ Accordingly, the Japanese labeled Wilson a hypocrite when the measure failed—though they, too, had their own purposes beyond a general appreciation for world peace.¹²¹

On the other hand, the League pursued normative measures and successfully passed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war, in addition to agreeing to several naval limitation treaties. The American Secretariat to the League of Nations, Arthur Sweetser, noted at its 10-year anniversary the League had: resolved 18 political controversies, repatriated 400,000 prisoners of war, resettled over four million refugees, and allocated more than \$400 million in loans for postwar reconstruction. Also, this multilateral effort agreed to the Young Plan and demonstrated a degree of foresight and pragmatism by reducing German reparations from \$32 billion to \$9 billion.¹²²

A breakthrough moment for the relative stability of the League system came with the Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in 1922. This treaty settled outstanding borders disputes and normalized relations between the two nations, but more importantly, it allowed the potential collaboration of Europe's two outcast nations to frighten the rest of Europe to soften its German antagonisms.¹²³ Additionally, Washington continued to play the role of creditor much to Europe and Germany's

¹¹⁹ Gill, *The League of Nations*, 165.

¹²⁰ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 51.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 47–54.

¹²² Gill, *The League of Nations*, 1–3.

¹²³ Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization*, 141.

benefit. This arrangement of supporting Europe with its recovery was somewhat functional for about a decade because of the United States' dynamic economic growth in the 1920s allowed Washington and U.S. banks to handle their leadership burden by granting loans and other support.¹²⁴

The League's beginning and its early success were tied into the fears and attractions of state leaders. The United States and European democracies did have an attraction to peace. The United States was also attracted to a European economy robust enough to foster trade. Europe on the other hand was attracted to receiving aid from the United States and therefore accepted at least some of Wilson's proposals to keep the Americans involved in Europe's rebuilding. Additionally, the nominal victors of the war had a fear of German power, so any international order that could assist in stunting its regrowth had appeal.¹²⁵

However, because Europe's leaders were so attracted to punishing Germany—largely due to democratic politics still held hostage by World War I nationalist passions—they continued their aggressive pursuit of reparations and territorial aggrandizement at Germany's cost. These actions by World War I's victors left the German people poor, insecure, and insulted. These conditions only benefited the most extreme and malignant forces within German society as radical communist and right-wing parties increased in popularity among those Germans most affected by the enforced impoverishment of the postwar order: the poor and the former middle class that had become poor despite its obedient working and saving.¹²⁶ As a result, and when American aid to Europe and Germany was severely reduced shortly before the Great Depression's onset, Germany's centrist government was further powerless to improve the lives of its people and made radical ideologies in the country all the more attractive to its people.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ James Devine, "The Cause of the 1929–33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation," *Research in Political Economy*, Vol. 14 (1994) 137–139.; Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 291–308.

¹²⁵ Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization*, 117–126.; Herring, *To Superpower*, chap. 10–11.

¹²⁶ Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 109–112.

¹²⁷ Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization*, 97–101, 118–120, 150.

B. THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE DEMISE OF WILSON'S LIBERAL ALTRUISM

What few multilateral successes that the League could claim began to diminish in 1928, when the U.S. economy started to falter, moved toward protectionism, and cut aid to Germany; the situation became even more dire in 1929 after the American stock market crashed and the Great Depression gripped the industrialized world.¹²⁸ Much like the Concert, the League was unable to keep up with the changing international climate, and the Great Depression, much like the Industrial Revolution, quickly undid the motivational force—however small—that had previously persuaded states to make decisions beneficial to the collective body. Existing financial pressures within Europe became worse; unemployment rose along with civil discontent, and both sides of the Atlantic embraced an ever more rigid protectionism as the way out. In the event, protectionism drove nations deeper in to economic malaise and weakened the multilateral system further as nations beggared their neighbors. The League's wan attempt to curtail protection policies among member states in 1933 was literally too little too late.¹²⁹

Interwar economics represented a symptom, not a cause, of the League's pending irrelevance. The real problem was the strain of mass politics, which no collection of debate-trained men in cylinder hats in the 1920s and 1930s could hope to manage or even well understand. Before the Industrial Revolution, the public had far less to do with international diplomacy and economic policies. When diplomats and leaders received news of a developing situation, they typically had plenty of time to make decisions—or deals with interlocutors who, nonetheless, probably had more in common with each other, whichever flag they served, than they did with the lower and middle classes of their own states. Through the end of the 18th century, these professionals did not have to account for public opinion to a large extent. Therefore, diplomatic and economic specialists could make decisions rationally and accordingly to national interests.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Ibid, 97–101, 118–120, 150.

¹²⁹ Gill, *The League of Nations*, 3–4.

¹³⁰ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 30–36, 57–60.

This diplomatic situation in the West began to change with the rise of mass politics and the technologies that enabled it over the course of the 19th century. By the dawn of the 20th century, newspapers, radio, other media, and an overall quicker news cycle intensified the effects of mass interest and participation in Europe's many young democracies. Now government, including internal and foreign affairs, was no longer the exclusive purview of crowned heads, aristocrats, and men educated like them. The public followed the events of the day with varying levels of attention and understanding, throwing its collective shoulder to policies that typically promised short-term and/or local benefits at the cost of any system-sustaining largesse. Thus, all policymaking became political in the sense of capturing (or diverting) the mood of the masses. Politicians courted their constituencies with quick, popular (or populist) decisions. And despite the "war to end all wars" rhetoric of only a few years earlier, Western electorates after World War I wanted national glory for themselves and national humiliation for their fondest enemies. As the Depression wore on, more and more of "the people" came to prize prosperity and order over the endless talking and compromise of democracy. As such, they also came to seek easy answers.¹³¹

This is not to say that Europeans did not want peace. World War I made them want peace as much as anybody; however, the efforts to achieve a lasting peaceful environment through multilateral measures could not come at the expense of defying the electorate's nationalism, and therefore, the public could not accept the nuanced solutions of assisting a former foe for the sake of latter peace and shared prosperity. For example, a diplomatic specialist could recognize the internal instability and rise of extremism in Germany and advise politicians to grant assistance to its weak democratic government despite past antagonisms because it was in the national interest in addition to being in the interest of the international community to prevent radical movements from finding favor among Germans. Unfortunately, this calculus does not play well to an electorate taught to hate Germany during the World War I years; politicians had to choose between what was prudent or what was popular. More precisely, state leaders were attracted to

¹³¹ Ibid, 30–36, 57–60.

staying in office, and as a result, were attracted to policies that were emotional and popular rather than practical and foresighted.¹³²

C. THE AGGRESSION OF JAPAN, THE RISE OF HITLER, AND THE EMASCULATION OF THE LEAGUE

The Great Depression proved to be the beginning of the end of the League. Despite its efforts, the League found its multilateral strength sapped when the prosperity of the 1920s disappeared and the one body favorable to multilateralism, the United States, lacked the political will to perform crisis management in international affairs—diplomatically or economically—because Washington was in an economic crisis of its own and its own domestic political forces proved to be economically beholden to beggar-thy-neighbor electorates as well. As a result economic conditions allowed fascist movements to gain momentum within increasingly weak governments like Italy and Germany. Additionally, imperial Japan took the opportunity to pursue militant foreign policy goals and Western leaders found themselves suffering from a lack of political will caused by their own fears, primarily the fear of losing elections.¹³³

Japan demonstrated that one of the Achilles' heels of multilateralism was political will. Much like Germany would do later, the Japanese began aggressive military operations in Manchuria while playing politics against those nations seeking collective security in the League. The strategy was simple: Wage war while speaking of peace. This “speaking of peace” while pursuing imperialism drove home two hard realities to 1930s multilateralism: peace-seeking nations did not have the available military means to deter a distant Japan; and the aversion to war in European and U.S. minds meant the West did not have the political will to refute the Japanese. Additionally, aggressor nations found that they could use the potential of future peace to provide an environment of appeasement; after all, politicians were attracted to being a voice of peace for electoral reasons and aggressiveness could go unpunished unless the electorates became fearful themselves.¹³⁴

¹³² Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 54–57.

¹³³ Gill, *The League of Nations*, 4–9.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 4–9.

For example, the United States, Japan, Britain, France, and Germany all entered the February 1933 League-sponsored World Disarmament Conference (WDC) with different desires based on their particular situations, but they all faced overwhelming economic hardships. They all agreed that maintaining large militaries was expensive. Thus, mutual disarmament should have been attractive to all parties for no other reason than saving money; however, much like the lead-up to World War I, a sense of fear among nations concerning Germany, and Germany's own insecurity, made the WDC another of the League's failures. Germany, given the military restrictions imposed by the post-World War I settlement and the devastation of successive economic crises, sought common security by bringing all nations down to its lowly military level. Germany pointed to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles that stated disarmament of all nations was ultimate goal of the treaty and Germany was merely the starting point. Thus, Germany sought common security through military equality by proposing that all nations' military power should be brought down to the German level. Britain, Italy, and the United States supported the plan but France struck it down.¹³⁵

France had different goals.¹³⁶ Given America's isolationist policies and Britain's lack of desire for a bi-lateral protection pact, Paris put primacy on national defense and sought to ensure that its own military power exceeded Germany's. As a result the French were not willing to disarm. On the other hand, blatant obstruction carried its own potential for diplomatic consequences among allies who were tiring of France's insistent belligerence. Thus, Paris submitted an outlandish plan that would surely be rejected because it favored no one's individual interest. Therefore, Paris had the cover of rejecting the German plan because its own plan was rejected. Paris chose this path with one primary motivation: it wanted to maintain status quo restrictions on Germany and not lose its temporary military superiority.¹³⁷

After the failure of the German and French plans, the U.S. plan called for a ban on all offensive weapons consisting of aircraft bombers, heavy mobile artillery, and tanks; the plan additionally sought a reduction of all defensive weapons by one-third. While

¹³⁵ Ibid, 9.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 9–10.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 9–10.

smaller nations supported this plan, nations with more military power did not. The meeting adjourned and Germans made clear they would not return to negotiations until their equality demands were met. The French left the meeting satisfied with maintaining the status quo blissfully unaware of its future consequence.¹³⁸

France's decision to obstruct the WDC was partly from its desire to influence the German elections immediately following the conference and hoped the stalemate would provide a more reasonable German leader. That election however made evident that many German people had lost faith in liberal governance and Adolf Hitler was elected to power.¹³⁹ Hitler promptly used the failed WDC negotiations to solidify his domestic political support and used the League's ineptitude to legitimize the German military buildup. In a word, Hitler asserted that he could give the German people security that the League could not.¹⁴⁰

Other leaders did not necessarily fear Germany in 1933 because its military was still small; however, they feared war because their electorates hated the possibility of war more than they disliked Germany.¹⁴¹ As such, Germany was able to follow a similar path as that of Japan. It consistently circumvented disarmament treaties, occupied weak neighboring countries despite Germany's temporarily weak military, used newly captured lands' resources to build the German military machine, and actually use the League to its own benefit by counting on the power of appeasement that was firmly entrenched in Europe's hearts and minds.¹⁴²

After Hitler came to power the attraction of appeasement led most politicians to appeal to their peace-seeking voters while Hitler, in turn, took maximum advantage of his enemies' fear of war. The spirit of appeasement allowed the Führer to aggressively defy Germany's postwar settlement, reclaim lost territories and annex others, and afterwards rampage through Poland before soundly defeating France and throwing the world into

¹³⁸ Ibid, 9–12.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 9–12.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 9–12.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 12–16.

¹⁴² Ibid, 12–16.

World War II. Ironically, words of peace came from every politician's mouth, including Hitler's, all along the path to history's next and most brutal war.¹⁴³

D. CONCLUSION

What must be appreciated is how the attractions and fears of politicians affected the League's design following World War I and continued to undermine multilateral security thereafter. Perhaps if not for democracy, or at least the mass-political aspects of 20th century democracy in practice, national leaders after World War I would have rationally brought Germany back into a respectable position in the world order and would have recognized that a stable German state would have favored everyone's interest. On the other hand, without democracies the League would have unlikely had its Wilsonian altruistic flavor and would have resembled the Concert more so than not. If the hatred that existed in the minds of Europeans as a result of World War I's horror and the various state's efforts to promote nationalism had not occurred, perhaps the League could have actually been liberal and electorates—and therefore politicians—would have been attracted to more pragmatic decisions that would have promoted international civilization over that of narrow national self-interest and dislike of Germany. That was not the case unfortunately. Instead, the conditions and circumstances created from World War I ironically created a perfect storm of an imprudent electorate's dislike of "others." It took both socially constructed identities and democratic governance to cause politicians and national leaders to make unwise policies that led the economic protectionism before and following the Great Depression and led politicians to punish Germany despite the risk of it becoming a failed then fascist and aggressive state. All of this occurred because World War I's unfortunate consequences and democratic influences on the decisions of state leaders. This caused foresight and prudence to be as irrelevant to politicians to the same extent that Aquinian altruism was irrelevant to rulers after the Thirty Years War.

Before World War II democratic governance attracted politicians to punish Germany both geo-politically and economically; and after the rise of Hitler, politicians were attracted to appeasement because the public simply did not want war. Therefore,

¹⁴³ Ibid, 12–16.; Gray, *War, Peace, and International Relations*, 129–135.

appeasement ruled the day; but this attraction for appeasement was not Machiavellian, Aquinian, or any other idea as such because democratic politics had made those old paradigms anachronistic. Instead, the spirit of Machiavellianism was diffused from the state level down to the individual politician rather he was a legislative member or the executive.

Ironically, Europe and the West would have been better off if the Machiavellian patterns of the past would have deterred Hitler from his earlier aggressions like the invasion of the Sudetenland. Even more ironically, all the previous moral dilemmas from Aquinas to Machiavelli to Wilson all lacked relevance to Europe's various leaders; rather, elections gave politicians new fears because of a simple attraction to electoral success. Therefore, democracy contributed to the coming of World War II as much as any other factor. After all, it is easier to be reelected by telling a public what it wants to hear rather than hoping to change an electorate's mind.

V. THE COLD WAR: BOLD BEGGAR STATES, BENIGN HEGEMONY, AND VIRTUOUS SELFISHNESS

The situation following World War II finally created conditions favorable to multilateralism. This circumstance was not because nations learned lessons and wanted peace more than before, nor was it due to superior statecraft or any other genius to overcome to the suspicion of peace and multilateralism, although these things contributed. Rather, it was because of a transformation of relative power to the liberal United States and the communist U.S.S.R. combined with the weakness of Europe and the continents changed social environment. State leaders and politicians now had new fears and attractions. Furthermore, Europe could not maintain its political sovereignty without the United States, while the United States could not hope to contain the Soviet Union nor foster capitalism in the west and beyond without Europe's military assistance and economic well-being. Now, the West had an "other" in form of the U.S.S.R. to motivate cooperation and give disparate peoples a common self-interest every bit as much as Catholic France gave British Protestants reason to pursue common goals in an earlier time.¹⁴⁴

Additionally, where the Europeans in the past experienced class conflict and other divisions of society before and during the interwar period, post-World War II "free" Europe—which was not under dominion of the Soviets following World War II—found itself forced between two models of society and had to choose a path into its future and hopefully it could be one very different from its Machiavellian past. Furthermore, free Europe had to choose this path from a position of military and economic weakness after being ravaged by history's deadliest war.¹⁴⁵

One path was communism to deal with Europe's massive poverty, hunger, and social unrest following the war. The other path was the U.S.-oriented liberal model.

¹⁴⁴ Ryan Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006) 8–13.; Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 70–74.

¹⁴⁵ Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 1–10.

America's free-market and consumer based economy had produced a living standard for its working class that would have made any socialist cringe at capitalism's ability to make the American worker's life so prosperous. Because of that American success, the European commoner had something different to be attracted to rather than the demagoguery of old-style European class warfare against their fellow capitalist countrymen. Instead, the working commoner could be attracted to having a higher standard of living in a system where the pie always grew, and class antagonisms made ever less sense. It was this transition of European commoner from an "other" hating nationalist or communist to a peace-loving consumer that gave the West a structural foundation favorable to multilateralism after World War II to the present in that it gave democratically chosen leaders the motivation to pursue peace over that of power.¹⁴⁶

More broadly, where in the past the moral conflict of power holders was between Machiavellian state interest versus a common good based on collective goods of security and peace—rather the common good was motivated by religious Aquinian thought or unique early 20th century liberal values—the West's leaders now found themselves weighing the dilemma of how much their respective nation should contribute to the common good of defense or the narrow national interest of welfare spending. As in the inter-war period, free Europe's leaders had to choose between popular or prudent decisions.¹⁴⁷

The changed nature of the European commoner, the rise of the United States and U.S.S.R, and the relative weakness of Europe in the post-World War II period were the primary reasons that centripetal forces of unity have been stronger than centrifugal ones; additionally and perhaps most importantly, it was this environment combined with the attraction of member states benefiting individually from NATO and the U.N. in these time periods that gave multilateralism its most important glue. Ironically, the potential that a state can benefit from another state pulling more of the load—rather it be common defense, security, or the promotion of peace and stability—that gave and still gives

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 1–14.

¹⁴⁷ Wallace Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting* (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2003), 255–259.

multilateralism its most powerful ability to stay relevant. In the past, present, and future, the United States has and will hold on to the hope that Europe will do more to pursue common interest, and likewise, Europe has and will continue to hope for the United States to do the same.¹⁴⁸

A. THE EUROPEAN COMMONER: FROM A NATIONALIST “MALTHUSIAN” TO A VIRTUOUS BRAT

It is individual selfishness that explains how the European citizen changed his ideological instincts from one that stood for something intrinsic—nationalism, religion, and class justice to name a few—into materialism that affected the fears and attractions of politicians and paved the way for electoral forces to benefit peace and multilateralism rather than democracy being a contributory force to future wars like it did during the interwar period. After all, war prevents one from enjoying the joys of television or movies and absorbs industrial and financial capabilities that otherwise might make mechanical servants such as dishwashers, clothes dryers, and washing machines. Therefore, to the commoner, big wars for whatever reason, just or not, disrupt the machine of free trade that makes his life convenient and enjoyable. This virtuous selfishness also goes beyond war, as it also contributed to domestic stability and tranquility. As with war and normative things like nationalism, selfish materialism softened the effect of class warfare in Europe. After all, who cares how much more others have if simple worker can afford to have things even the wealthier classes couldn't have possessed only two or three decades before.¹⁴⁹

The standard of living in Europe and the United States during the 1920s differed starkly and explains why European society—nationalist, poor, and rife with class conflict—had so many more problems than its American counterpart until the post-World War II environment. For example, in 1929 the average American worker in Detroit annually bought “five shirts, two ties, two cotton union suits, fourteen pairs of cotton socks... one pair of suspenders, two pairs of shoes, two pairs of leather and nine pairs of

¹⁴⁸ Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 255–260, 280–284.

¹⁴⁹ Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 1–10.

cotton work gloves.”¹⁵⁰ What the typical Detroit factory workers wife bought was more impressive and what she bought for her typical two children on average went even further. The lady of the house would renew her entire wardrobe every two years with a variety of dresses, eight pairs of stockings, multiple nightgowns, and at least two pairs of shoes; the children benefited even more with the average family spending one-twentieth of their annual budget on the youngsters’ apparel.¹⁵¹ Meanwhile, the average European working-class family’s clothes were almost entirely homemade or handed down. Not only that, but American families’ clothes were higher in quantity and quality, and were stylish enough that working-class Americans often had better wardrobes than all of Europe, excluding the most privileged of European classes.¹⁵²

This relative prosperity also went beyond clothes. Most American families had a kitchen, running water, electricity, and enjoyed a variety of affordable cosmetics and personal hygiene products that made them different from their European counterparts in more than just appearance and lifestyle, but also scent. In Europe these living conditions was something only the wealthier citizens enjoyed. Moreover, these living conditions were achieved with only a small minority of American workers unionized. Indeed, the most affluent blue-collar Americans worked for the Ford Motor Company, which was not unionized, and this point was perhaps most surprising to Europeans. Additionally, where most European workers could not dream of having a car, about half of Americans not only owned one, but many had new cars because the Model T was only about \$440 during the 1920s and thus was affordable to the masses. While the American standard of living dropped drastically in the Great Depression, it later recovered during World War II and a destroyed Europe could not help but notice how America’s capitalist ways benefited its citizens despite background or class. Europe’s transition to this American way of mass consumerism and social organization allowed Europe to move from its combative competitions of the past into a more benign desire of Europeans to have more stuff.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 88.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 89.

¹⁵² Ibid, 89.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 88–91.

Both the elite politician and the commoner were in two different kinds of conflict in pre-World War II Europe, and both of these conflicts can be considered a “Malthusian vise,” where the world was seen as a zero-sum game rather it be geopolitical affairs or matters of domestic class distinction. Because of the vise, and a overbearing instinct to distinguish “we” and “others” at all levels from nation-states to domestic classes, Europe was segmented and did not have a singular market necessary for mass consumerism—where products are made to sell to a whole society—because every social group and nation sought to distinguish itself as separate and better than national or domestic “others” and sought to gain the upper hand at the “others” expense. On the international scene this dynamic primed France and Britain’s treatment of democratic Germany during the interwar period. At the domestic level this segmentation was done between classes and political groups. What they all had in common was a zero-sum mentality.¹⁵⁴

Such fundamental zero-sum extremism in all things fueled the non- or anti-democratic movements of the time. Because liberalism and consumerism would allow all to have better life, Hitler declared himself opposed to both because when people “want to lead a life like others and cannot,” he could couch their needs as the “bread of survival,” a hunger that could only be slaked by the “fruit of war.”¹⁵⁵ In other words, mass consumerism and a higher standard of living through economic growth rather than taking it from others would slacken Hitler’s appeal; not only was he well aware of this, but it was his nationalistic, anti-liberal, and anti-communist stance that made the German *Mittelstand* perfect Nazis. Victoria de Grazia in *Irresistible Empire* best explains why:

Drawn from the artisan economy, state bureaucracies, and the modern service sector, their incomes often differed little from the wages of the unionized, skilled working classes, though in terms of lifestyle and mental habits they couldn’t live like workers, any more than they or their wives could engage in manual labor. It was their intimate distress about the crumbling hierarchies of the old regime of consumption that made of an emotional war zone, and their fear of losing this struggle with a Medusa-

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 77.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 76.

like enemy—the workers, America, the rich, the Jew—that pitched them onto the side of reactionaries in the 1930s.¹⁵⁶

Therefore, it was the class segmentation in Europe combined with combative ideologies and economic depression that allowed the most aggressive and detrimental groups to come to power within nations like Germany. Obviously, these groups had no interest in reducing conflict with multilateral and conciliatory measures, but instead, needed conflict to elevate their own “we” group at the expense of “others” and justify their own elite rule by the presence of conflict itself.¹⁵⁷

After World War II this situation changed. Europe was destroyed, its social classes were similarly miserable and a whole generation of young men was decimated, and that was in the lucky countries. Others, like Soviet-occupied Germany and Eastern Europe, found themselves even more devastated; Berlin alone saw 110,000 women raped upon its fall to Soviet forces.¹⁵⁸ Whatever the new age portended, the old Europe with its global preeminence and the conflict-riven society that roiled beneath the pre-war prosperity was gone.

While Europe’s problems were astounding at the close of World War II, it was also this fresh starting point and the necessities this destruction demanded that ultimately allowed free Europe to remake its self and its values. Sir William Beveridge’s 1942 description of Britain could have been applied to all of post-World War II Europe; it was a society filled by five “social evils” being “illness, ignorance, disease, squalor, and want” and nothing else than universal health care and education, subsidized housing, and government insurance for unemployment would hold their war-torn societies together.¹⁵⁹ But the same force that led to Europe’s welfare state direction also led to open and free markets: everyone just wanted a decent and higher standard of living. Perhaps it was the misery of the worst war in history that changed formally competitive paradigms. The desires to glorify the nation or cause—whether it be communist, fascist, or any other

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 110.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 108–110.

¹⁵⁸ Wasserstein, *Barbarism*, 401.

¹⁵⁹ De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 339.

ideological paradigm—fell into perspective after Europeans witnessed the hell they and their children had suffered and politicians in the United States and Europe both realized that elevating people’s standard of living was a vital need.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, everyone—from U.S. presidents to European parliament members—was attracted to electoral success, facilitated by bigger slices of the growing pie for the electorate, and practical measures of prosperity became more attractive policies than ideology and conflict.

American style business practices quickly infiltrated a new welfare Europe and Europe’s new value of a decent standard of living for all assisted in giving the continent a more homogeneous market for those same American business practices. As a result, Europe became more commercially American than they were willing to admit.¹⁶¹

Not only did these consumer trends affect economics, but they transformed social life within Europe and the values we now associate with progress, like gender equality. After all, if European women were capable of choosing between different washing machines or shampoo, why would they not become choosier in other avenues of life? More importantly, Miss Europe voted and the following question had to be in the mind of European politicians: “Would it not be better to compete in the relative merits of washing machines than in the strength of rockets?”¹⁶²

Ultimately, America’s market empire changed the nature of identities. In the past one’s identity was where he stood in the Malthusian zero-sum conflict, now one’s identity—whether it be a housewife, worker, business man, or sports fan—was not an identity of conflict, but a segment of a market that businesses strove to satisfy in order to earn their money.¹⁶³ Essentially, America’s market empire changed Europe and gave the common European a selfish but virtuous desire for more consumer goods instead of desiring more power; furthermore, more stuff through divisions of labor requires more international cooperation to foster free markets. Conversely, expensive wars keep people in a free-market system from having more stuff; therefore, multilateralism was attractive

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 340–341.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 342–349.

¹⁶² Ibid, 416–456.

¹⁶³ Ibid, 415–456.

and prosperity was a bottom up force that motivated politicians to cooperate internationally.

America's market empire as a matter of financial practice by itself was not a contributory force to multilateralism; however, its socialization of the values among Western people was. Whether it was the French communist or the die-hard maintainer of French Empire in Algeria or Asian colonies, the difficulty of pursuing realpolitik amidst a new age of female empowerment and the desire for a better life for all—all things socialized intrinsically by desire for mass-consumer goods—made the old ways of Malthusian advantages acquired through political and military force not only anachronistic and out-of-style with developing European attitudes, but in many ways, became immoral to voters and accordingly to their politicians. Simply, to the individuals dedicated to such intrinsic and nearly spiritual pursuits of ideology, whether it be communist or nationalist, faced a new reality that made their Malthusian goals a path of most resistance if not downright impossible against the immediate and constant desires of a housewife to have a new washing machine or the worker buying a new car while simultaneously doing their own part to produce consumer goods themselves in order to earn a wage. Signally, these Malthusian warriors lost political power, and the will to pursue those zero-sum goals for that matter.

Furthermore, Market Empire made Europe more American and free Europe took up a free-market and individual liberty based identity that contrasted itself against the Soviet East as much as Protestantism in Britain created a common bond among former English and Scottish foes against their common Catholic foe in an earlier time. This was a change of worldviews to the French and German commoner or politician and in a sense was a replacement ideology—of individual liberty and well-being—over that of class or national aggrandizement and glory. Now, the purpose of the state was for the benefit and protection of individual, not the individual for the aggrandizement of the collective cause of nation. This western ideology of the individual—whether the individual be man, woman, Jew, Christian, capitalist, or worker—was a moral political force more powerful than Aquinas could have ever hoped to achieve. As such, with every individual action—the worker buying the car, the woman choosing from multiple brands of shampoo, or any

other individual decision made under the capitalist market empire—the work and sacrifice necessary to pursue any other Malthusian option became absurd as bloodletting to cure sickness. In essence, Market Empire—like British Protestantism—gave the West a deep and broad cultural acceptance of a common identity, cause, and a moral code worth defending with war if necessary...at least if the United States would assist. Because of Market Empire, the West became a liberal “we” distinct from the illiberal Soviet “other” as a matter of both essence and ideology; a commonality necessary for multilateralism to survive its constant challenges.

B. THE UNITED NATIONS

The international situation following World War II reinforced this new pacific nature of the West and made international multilateral efforts attractive because it addressed the fear of three nightmare scenarios: Europe falling into its old power politic ways, Soviet domination, and nuclear war. After all, the new peaceful nature of new Europe mattered little if it fell under the Communist or was caught in a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. Therefore, multilateral institutions were the only way Europe could prevent the worst case—any worst case. Multilateralism also promised to keep Europe from being completely subservient to American hegemony.¹⁶⁴

The waning stages of World War II forced the United States to recognize that its past isolationist tendencies would only lead to future calamities. It was Roosevelt’s wish to have an international body to police the world and ensure norms of peace were obeyed not through altruistic agreements, but by the threat of force that only the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain could provide in order to deter later repeats of past aggressions. By the same token, however, the great-powers model would not suffice. Essentially, all nations and peoples had suffered and all wanted a say in any new organization that would foster peace. Additionally, the normative pressures of the time in the West dictated that a new order had to be democratic in nature.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 69–75.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 73–74.

Therefore, public support combined with the horrors of war made the most agreeable solution the formation of a new organization, one more powerful than the League, that all nations could join and replace past systems like power balancing and secret alliances. So, the general concept of the United Nations deviated from that of the League in that peace would not be pursued through international disarmament, but rather, peace would be enforced by the threat of force and the use of diplomacy to guide that force.¹⁶⁶ Accordingly, states joining the United Nations agreed to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”¹⁶⁷

Human rights also played a major role. With the horrors of the war fresh in living memory, the abuse of human rights emerged as a security threat to all because leaders who achieved power through violating human rights to gain and maintain power were more likely to threaten their neighbors upon consolidation of national power. Additionally, poor economic conditions were seen as a precondition to such dangerous leaders gaining power. Essentially, restraint, human rights, and prosperity became something to be enforced, fostered, and were something as vital to international security as that of warships and tanks. Given that both of these circumstances was directed at the state level and human dignity and welfare were so important to maintaining security, it was almost as if the original framework of the United Nations had finally given Aquinas his way because his values were now enforceable international norms.¹⁶⁸

However, the diplomatic renaissance after World War II quickly was subdued by real world events. States still acted on their narrow self-interest and violated the U.N. charter if they believed the international body would not stop them. The Soviet Union clearly advertised its true colors and dominated Eastern Europe. The British and French

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 73–74.; Thierry Tardy, “The UN and the Use of Force: A Marriage Against Nature,” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1, (2007): 49–51.

¹⁶⁷ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 74.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 74–75.

held onto their colonial holding despite the U.N. charters emphasis on human rights and democracy, and the United States moved unilaterally in recognizing the statehood of Israel despite a lack of international consensus and did not even attempt to reach it for that matter. However, because the West was the creator and self-proclaimed enforcer of the rules, these values of democracy, security, self-determination, and human rights gained power nonetheless. Decolonization continued to occur due to European weakness and America's desire. Accordingly, weak states entered the U.N. after their decolonization and used the West's own principles—once used to champion the West's cause against Hitler—to diplomatically counter their former colonial oppressors.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, when the Soviet Union or any other illiberal nation found themselves criticized by the United States concerning human rights in the 1940s through 1960s, all the illiberal dictators had to do was point to the treatment of black citizens within the United States.¹⁷⁰ In other words, the benign values of the West became rhetorical weapons for all.¹⁷¹

Human rights as a political force gained even more power when the United Nations—via the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—created numerous agencies to expose and punish violations of various countries. In this way the United Nations changed the nature of international affairs and human rights regulations attracted some leaders to use violations of other states to their own political benefit while other nations felt pressure to change their own behavior because they feared the criticism of other nations.¹⁷²

However, there were still strong forces of attraction to the U.N. as a body. The richer and more powerful West wanted the body there to prevent a return to power politics and weaker nations wanted the United Nations so that they could punch above their weight and influence international politics in a way that could never occur

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 70–79.

¹⁷⁰ Paul Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (New York: Random House, 2006), 181.

¹⁷¹ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 70–79.

¹⁷² Ibid, 70–79.

otherwise. Another attraction was the ability of the United Nations to allow heads of states to save face in dire circumstances and back out of situations they had, to a degree, created for themselves. For instance, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis began when the Soviets emplaced medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles from the U.S. coast. Neither of the superpowers had any interest in allowing the crisis to escalate into nuclear war; however, with both sides fearing that any sign of weakness or compromise would signal an opportunity for the other to be more aggressive, the situation ground into a stalemate with clearly annihilatory implications. Fortunately, UN Secretary General U Thant communicated with the United States, the Soviets, and Cuba and worked out a compromise that did not require or allow any party to take credit or blame—internationally or at home. While the fear of nuclear war from both superpower adversaries made Thant’s compromise possible—which consisted of removing Soviet missiles from Cuba and American missiles from Turkey—the fear of both superpowers losing their bargaining leverage against one another in the future gave the existence of an international body an attractive way for leaders to back out of a crisis they had caused themselves. In other words, the United Nations was attractive because it gave peace a chance even after the Soviet superpower miscalculated and brought the world to the brink of nuclear warfare.¹⁷³

Even though no nation will get everything it wants out of the United Nations, that loss is not as costly as the alternative of power politics and the military preparedness it necessitates. In light of the U.N.’s ability to spread values, resolve disputes, promote humanitarian aid and international trade, all of its shortcomings cannot diminish the order’s value because the body is only capable of what its sovereign member states allow. Whether it was the fear of power politics, nuclear war, or domination of a super power, the relevancy and benefit of the United Nations must be recognized as successful primarily because of the attractive, multilateral alternative it offers its member state leaders and politicians—however powerful their states may or may not be.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 82.; Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man*, 61–62.

C. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

For the first half century of the United Nations, the Security Council failed to live up to the founders' hopes, as its permanent members—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China among them—sat on different sides of the Cold War divide. With these hopes dashed, no other multilateral effort demonstrates the importance of state leaders' fears and attractions more so than NATO. The threat of the Soviet Union and its clear disregard for the Western values of the United Nations were the main catalyst for the formation and continued development of NATO throughout the Cold War.¹⁷⁴ That fear of Soviet domination and the reality that the United Nations alone could not do much to check such aggression prompted some old-fashioned balancing to protect the democratic West. Such events as the Berlin Crisis of 1948 and the Korean Crisis in 1950 were all the more frightening because the left-over Soviet military power at the end of World War II contrasted menacingly with the relative weakness of Europe. Thus, NATO was wrought, in the first instance, of the fear shared by Europe and the United States. This fear had a nuclear nuance—and an existential charge. Therefore, NATO became an organization to prevent war even more so than one to defeat the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁵ With the defense policies and practices of the member states intertwined and interdependent, NATO emerged as perhaps the signal multilateral success story.

To be sure, member state actions—an ambivalent series of dances around deterrence, risk shifting, and burden sharing—demonstrate state interest was paramount and that the only reason that the organization existed was because of the fears and attractions of its member states. NATO was not a simple case of the West's "we" against the Communist "others"; the West's "we" states also competed with each other. Each NATO state fought to ensure that it received maximum protection against the communist giant while simultaneously foisting as many costs onto the other members, each protesting that it was already doing all that it could manage politically or economically. Additionally, each nation strove to ensure that it had maximum influence in the direction and decision making in NATO because they all feared two things: diplomatic

¹⁷⁴ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 75.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 92–96.

marginalization and other nations bringing them to war with the Soviets. None of the members wanted (or want) to see the alliance diminished, but all of them had constituencies at home that typically did not put much priority on the esoteric workings of collective defense. As such, the alliance eventuated as a collection of distinct and discrete nations that share certain key fears and attractions.¹⁷⁶

At the same time, NATO managed to bring the diverse parts of the West together, even as the logic of burden-shifting seemed to drive them apart. From the U.S. perspective, the Soviet Union was a threat but could be countered with nuclear superiority for the time being. However, Washington could deter the Soviet Union over the long run and hope to win the ideological battle of liberty versus centrally directed equality only if the free nations of Europe and North America had the robust economic health necessary to pay for a suitably capable force.¹⁷⁷ This calculus was complicated, in the U.S. view, by the tenuous economic health and military capability of its allies. European states could not rebuild their armed forces faster than their fragile, post-war economies could provide. Europe could ill afford massive armies and nuclear arsenals—though these great-power trappings retained some allure for the larger western European states. The United States came to direct most of NATO’s nuclear deterrence and contingency planning, while Europe was left to go along, often grumbling. In the end, Europe was attracted to American aid and security, and the United States was attracted to having a healthy free Europe that could sustain a lively trade and afford capable enough militaries to counter the Soviet threat, remove the need for U.S. forces in Europe, and ideally, keep any potential war on the other side of the Atlantic. Essentially, America needed Europe to be a nuclear-armed tripwire against the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁸

Europe remained skeptical of the level of U.S. commitment. The initial U.S. and British strategy, which was made clearly from strategic self-interest, consisted of allies retreating to buy time for a future Normandy-style invasion to retake Europe. Not surprisingly, this plan aroused more insecurity among the other allies because it would

¹⁷⁶ Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 250–284

¹⁷⁷ Sloan, *Permanent Alliance*, Kindle edition, chap. 4.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, Chap. 4.: Jordan, *Norstad*, 80.

once again leave Europe conquered and devastated. After the potential political crisis of this situation became apparent, Washington finally moved to a front-line defensive strategy combined with nuclear strikes against Soviet forces and population centers with OPLAN OFFTACKLE in 1949.¹⁷⁹

The theater-level military planning was only half of the allies' problem because the rearmament of Germany was another issue that seemed doomed to deadlock progress of the alliance. France did not want West Germany rearmed out of fear; many elites in West Germany did not want to join NATO as membership would ensure the permanent division of greater Germany. But the United States wanted Germany armed so that more of the defense burden could be shifted to Europe. The French were already at odds with American political hegemony concerning the decision-making of Europe's security; after all, why enable the German threat when the Soviet threat is deterred by American nuclear weapons? The Americans wanted to avoid long-term heavy commitments to Europe but at the same time dismissed French demands of European determination and only tacitly pursued the German issue out of fear of alienating France; on the other hand, the French would not strengthen the European pillar by rearming the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁸⁰ America feared over-commitment and European dependence; conversely, France feared Germany, American hegemony within NATO, and the possibility of being overrun by the Soviets while the U.S. and Britain prepared for another Operation Overlord that may or may not happen after France was destroyed thrice in a century.

Fortunately—and unfortunately at the same time—the Korean War adjusted the previous held paradigms and new fears allowed NATO to finally overcome previously impassible self-interest.¹⁸¹ The ultimate change of NATO paradigms after the Korean invasion was based on a lost sense of security centered on simple and economically efficient nuclear deterrence. If American nuclear weapons did not deter North Korea—and because the United States choose not to use them during the conflict—nuclear weapons might not deter the Soviet Union either. Now France realized that the German

¹⁷⁹ Jordan, *Norstad*, 74–77.

¹⁸⁰ Sloan, *Permanent Alliance*, Chap. 2, Kindle edition.

¹⁸¹ Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 64–65.

issue was not as paramount as it once thought and opened to the possibility of rearming its eastern neighbor as part of the European Defense Community (EDC) that allowed for rearmament under a multilateral command structure. Although the EDC ultimately failed when the French vetoed their plan, it did change the French paradigm enough to later include German rearmament under the NATO integrated command structure in 1955.¹⁸²

The Korean invasion also made German fear of invasion more important than the reunification of their country. Additionally, the Korean invasion prompted the United States to deemphasize its dreams of a limited presence in Europe in favor of its strategic European tripwire, and the United States committed more heavily to European defense. Perhaps NATO headquarters should have a statue of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung out front, for without his invasion of South Korea, NATO nations' fears and attractions may have never aligned enough to make the alliance what it became.¹⁸³

Because the Soviets had proven themselves technically proficient beyond expectations in the development strategic arms with their detonation of the hydrogen bomb in 1953 (a scant year after the Americans' first detonation) and then the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the allies felt increasingly insecure. This environment allowed for a greater acceptance of U.S. hegemony in NATO, to France's dismay. In its turn, the United States placed massive numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe under NATO control. While this move did involve some polemics, the controversy over the political/military and European/American control of the nuclear weapons was closer to convergence than any other NATO crises because fear was at such a high point. What made all other nations willing to accept this new vision of massive retaliation was the elite *Zeitgeist* of military austerity in favor of rebuilding European economies, and the realization that NATO conventional forces had no hope of victory because Soviet conventional forces dwarfed them.

This allied consensus on massive retaliation soon proved unable to survive the fear caused by the Cuban Missile Crises and the subsequent advent of "flexible

¹⁸² Sloan, *Permanent Alliance*, Chap. 2–3, Kindle edition.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, Chap. 2–3, Kindle edition.

response.”¹⁸⁴ What Kennedy interpreted as raising the threshold for nuclear war Europe—particularly France—interpreted as America weakening its commitment to Europe. In de Gaulle’s famous calculus, the United States seemed unlikely to sacrifice New York for Berlin or Paris. Then came the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which the French viewed as a move by Washington to prevent France from further development of its own nuclear weapons in an American effort to monopolize NATO nuclear politics. The Franco-American divergence, among other events, led France to leave the command structure.

The military and political consequence of flexible response is best understood by examining the views and actions of several key personalities and nations concerning risk and burden-shifting. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO from 1956 to 1963, had several misgivings about the Kennedy strategy and the oncoming crisis the alliance would have to face in the near future. A series of memoranda captured Norstad’s reservations: Allied conventional forces will never match up to the Soviet horde; the desired build-up of conventional forces was too expensive and unsustainable; the strategic move to provide an escalation—or pause—before massive nuclear retaliation weakened the level of deterrence and thus increased the chance of war; flexible response weakened allies faith in U.S. determination; and the best advantage that the United States had was its nuclear advantage and Washington should take full advantage of this deterrence. Although Kennedy ultimately rejected Norstad’s advice, the diagnosis of “over-optimism” about flexible response was a predictor of crises yet to be exacerbated in inter-NATO relations throughout the remainder of the Cold War.¹⁸⁵

The desired increase of military forces and weakening of nuclear resolve by Kennedy against Soviet “salami slicing”¹⁸⁶ led to an increased sense of insecurity in other NATO allies. While these insecurities existed beforehand and were factors merely held dormant before the change of strategy, the consequence made NATO an inter-allied

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, Chap. 4, Kindle edition.

¹⁸⁵ Jordan, *Norstad*, 184–188.

¹⁸⁶ “Salami slicing” was a fear that the Soviet Union would slowly take over Europe by only violating NATO countries’ sovereignty a little bit at a time in so that the fear of escalation would prevent significant retaliation from NATO allies.

competition of deflecting risk. “Each member [had] sought to ensure that it would not have to fight alone, yet each has also hoped that any fighting would be kept as far from its own territory as possible.”¹⁸⁷ This pursuit of national interest within the alliance led to deadlock and damaged trust among allies. The advent of flexible response had the United States using Europe as a “firebreak,” ensuring a war would remain in Europe and not threaten U.S. territory with ICBMs. Europe, on the other hand, wanted American skin in the game to ensure it met the same fate as its allies to ensure commitment; Europeans were afraid that a slow and deliberate escalation of general war would allow Europe to be overrun and tempt Washington to sit it out.¹⁸⁸

The constant push and pull of alliance unity throughout the Cold War made NATO an ambivalent balance of managing national leaders fears and attractions. Whether it was later medium range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter Soviet threats or the strategic implications of détente were each nation sacrificed alliance unity to normalize relations with the U.S.S.R, European nations seemingly chose to do just enough to maintain Washington’s security umbrella while at the same time minimizing their own risk and sacrifice in the overall deterrent against the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁹

However, the Cold War element of NATO is only a portion of the multilateral story. What is often overlooked in the NATO saga is the total disappearance of war between European states. In hindsight it seems obvious, but the observation that power politics was made irrelevant in free Europe would have been unimaginable in 1939. Throughout all of Europe’s centuries of violent competition, from Westphalia to Versailles, the incessant fear of nations concerning their own security within a competitive system disappeared the day Washington committed to Europe in its joining of NATO; the United States, by being the protector of Europe, destroyed that same insecurity and fear that had led to the continents violent past.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 250.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 250–260.

¹⁸⁹ Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 54 (Spring 1984): 64–82.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 64–82.

By making power politics and its constant calculation and re-calculation of nations security and future security something of irrelevance—at least out side the Soviet threat—free Europe had little reason to fear invasion or seriously prepare for invasion and make its neighbors uncomfortable for that matter. That fear, of another’s power or future power, almost immediately became a non-concern to European neighbors and the decisions to cooperate in endeavors like the European Steel and Coal Community or other nascent predecessors to the European Union became rational decisions because the United States removed the Malthusian security dynamic from nations economically cooperating and collectively empowering each other because they had to no longer fear West Germany invading France any more so than Belgium invading Luxemburg.¹⁹¹

The biggest achievement of NATO was the coupling of American security to Europe. While this on the surface almost makes NATO seem non-multilateral in that Europe had little incentive to contribute to its own security against the Soviet threat—after all, its contribution would have been minimal compared to the deterrence of the United States in any situation—it was the act of making inter-European security competition anachronistic that removed the Malthusian fear of Europe’s nations and opened the door to other more multilateral efforts like the EU. All of this would have been impossible in the absence of each individual European nation’s dependence on American security and it is unlikely that America would have offered this security if it did not fear the potential of a Soviet dominated Europe. In essence, it was not NATO per say that was the West’s multilateral triumph, but it was the removal of nation-state insecurity—with an entrapped American security umbrella within NATO—that allowed multilateral cooperation between nations to be possible. Fear created NATO and NATO ended fear between neighbors.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 64–75.

¹⁹² Ibid, 80–81.

D. CONCLUSION

The effects of Market Empire, the attraction of risk shifting and burden sharing, and fear of nuclear war are all profound examples of the roles of fear and attraction in the West's use of multilateralism; however, they are only a sampling and are but the tip of the iceberg. The combination of all these things—attraction to a decent standard of life, morality, security, international influence, and others doing work toward a common interest—combined with the fear of war was the multilateral glue that held Western multilateralism together during the Cold War.

While attraction to peace had always existed, albeit weakly when compared to other self-interested attractions and more pressing fears, it was in the aftermath of World War II that a new fear contributed to a desire of the U.N., NATO, and multilateralism in general. That fear was of Europe's own nature, a nature that had produced incessant war and competition, and it was almost as if Europeans did not trust themselves with the freedom to act in their own interest and did not have confidence in their future decisions. Furthermore, the way Enlightenment and modernity had created such things as nationalism, modern weapons, and other expedients to war, it was also as if Europeans were willing to a degree let go of their own national fates after witnessing what they had done to themselves. As such, new normative paradigms took shape; paradigms that made past objective pressures such as international security competition an evil in itself and this to a degree replaced the normative value of jingoistic nationalism.

Ironically, the West returned to universal values similar to those of the medieval Papacy but in a modern and humanist nature. Furthermore, altruism found a political force as World War II closed, but nearly by accident. America was founded on the fear of tyranny more so from its domestic government than that of invaders and only after World War II did it accept a superpower role when the Soviets presented themselves as a threat. Essentially, communism allowed fear to push America to benefit Europe and the continent was only too willing to accept, not altruistically per say, but out of fear; western liberal altruism as a political force was nearly an accidental side effect. When this collective guilt and self-admitted moral weakness of Europeans was combined with the destruction of World War II the normative aspects of Aquinas's just war principals

became a political force rather than a mere moral argument despite many not even knowing who Aquinas was; furthermore, the religious principles of “just war” tradition enforced by the United Nations was now a salvation of Europeans from themselves! In retrospect, the values of the medieval Church and the U.N. were very similar; they just had a different source of legitimacy and God was replaced by internationalism. More importantly, this was a reality according to Europe’s public perception and that perception was empowered through elections. Morality finally had political force on state leaders.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ Lauren, *Force and Statecraft*, 70–79.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. THEN, NOW, AND THE FUTURE

While at first glance, and in almost a sweeping heuristic paradigm, it would be easy to say that the Europe and America finally got multilateralism right after the end of World War II; but this statement would be wrong. It was not multilateralism that saved Europe from power politics; Europe was saved by its relative weakness in the face of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

If not for the self-interest of the United States having a liberal and prosperous Western Europe to help combat the Soviet Union materially and ideologically, the motivations of politicians would have been much different if not for the Marshall Plan and America's security guarantee in NATO. French fear of a resurgent Germany would have remained, German insecurity of a divided nation and the dynamic of Soviet fear would have played out differently, and Europe would have likely been a devastated post-war landmass with social violence and state insecurity facing bigger challenges than ever. It was an accidental fate of American national interest and its liberal ideology that gave Europe a different path from power politics of the old stripe that had gone wrong. The West's success in multilateralism in the post-World War II and Cold War era was on the back of the United States and the coincidental alignment of a prosperous and free Europe being in American interest; however, the results of a prosperous West could not have been maintained and empowered without such institutions as NATO and the UN. For without them, like the Cuban Missile Crises and the efforts That demonstrate, a purely bi-polar world of American and Soviet dominance could have been much different.¹⁹⁴

Additionally, the benefits that NATO and the U.N. offer have been in American interest overall. Whether it is through the UN's spread of Western values via the use of human rights as rhetorical weapons, or merely the ability of Washington to station military forces in Europe through NATO to promote its own power, the accident of post-World War II Western multilateralism has benefited the United States as much as Washington has benefited Western multilateralism. It is in the overall environment and

¹⁹⁴ Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," 64–81.

how this world wide multilateral environment has affected the decision-making cycle of all leaders that has made Western multilateral institutions most beneficial to Europe and the United States.

Fear and attraction have had overbearing effect on multilateralism all the way back to the Catholic Church in the 16th century and these forces have lasted to the present day in the way nations deal with each other. It was the fear of both Catholic rivals and domestic upheaval after the death of Queen Elizabeth that allowed political figures within the Protestant British Isles the ideal circumstance to form a multilateral order among the islands' kingdoms; afterwards, it was the reinforcing prosperity of Empire that entrenched the British multilateral experiment into every one of its citizens' identity and essence.

On the European continent, it was the weakening of the Catholic Church and kings' attraction to disregarding the Churches altruistic restraints to address their fears of internal religious strife and foreign invasion. This development led European kings to adopt Machiavellian paradigms over that of his Aquinian rival philosophy; thus, these things led to the age of power politics. Later, it was the fear of the French Revolution repeating itself and the attraction of European leaders not meeting the same fate as French royalty and aristocrats that motivated international restraint under the Congress System and the Concert of Europe.

The fear of revolutions was later abated by the Industrial Revolution's force of nationalism and the proliferation of industrialized armies forced leaders to once more address their fears of invasion by reverting back to their power politic ways in the lead up to World War I. After the Great War, the attraction of politicians to please their nationalist and vengeful voters led them to punish Germany and the same fear of those vengeful—yet war adverse—voters, motivated politicians to conduct appeasement toward Nazi Germany and Imperil Japan and made the political will necessary to keep the League of Nation's relevant a nonexistent force. Therefore, the League of Nations found itself no more effective at preserving multilateral peace and security than Neville Chamberlain was at stopping Hitler.

Finally, it was the fear of the Soviet Union and nuclear holocaust combined with the attraction to a peaceful world order protected by American nuclear weapons that attracted free Europe into the UN's and NATO's embrace; furthermore, it was the change of the European voter into a mass and American like consumer instead of an Malthusian nationalist or class warrior that gave politicians reason to pursue national prosperity over that of national power; thus, these things made the post-World War II and Cold War international order one favorable to multilateralism.

All of these episodes of the international system were caused by the fears and attractions of people with the power to dictate the direction of their countries—whether they were kings, prime ministers, presidents, or members of congresses or parliaments. Therefore, in the epoch that is now dawning or has recently dawned, the fears and attractions of these men and woman shall dictate whether multilateralism endures, remains relevant, and has the capacity and collective political will either to meet international challenges with multilateralism, or even better, shape a current situation to ensure challenges unfavorable to multilateral institutions do not get terribly severe in the first place. Ultimately, it is the international and domestic environments that these leaders exist within that determine their fears and attractions, and therefore, it is the environment that determines the success of Western multilateral institutions.

A. YESTERDAY'S SOLUTIONS AS TOMORROW'S PROBLEMS

Today, perhaps much like in 1928, the West finds its self at a crossroads, and at first glance, the forces of fear and attraction appear to only reinforce the current multilateral international system. After all, there are plenty of reasons for nations to play the multilateral game of avoiding war, increasing trade, and using an multilateral system—rather it be NATO, the United Nations, the European Union or otherwise—because there is something to be gained by a state from being involved in these multilateral institutions for its own self-interest. Furthermore, the disappearing act of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early '1990s did not weaken multilateral cooperation of Western states but actually increased it.

If there was any chance of Western multilateralism being weakened at the end to the Cold War it quickly disappeared with Europe's dependence on NATO—primarily the United States—to solve the various Balkan crises of the 1990s that the new EU could not. Once again, the multilateral NATO was aggrandized by the unilateral contribution from American power. Not only did Europe's inability to handle problems in its own back yard contribute to the post-Cold War relevance of NATO, but it highlighted the need for Europe to organize its own common security program so that it would not have to depend on its American partner and this began the long process toward the EU's Common Security and Defense Program, a supranational military arrangement of only EU nations—a possibility only made possible by the American created secure environment Europe benefited from.¹⁹⁵

Additionally, the challenges that Western nations face today are often uniform among all; among these challenges are terrorism, failed states, climate-change, and additionally, the need for economic prosperity within a highly interconnected world make challenges to the West every bit as difficult, and more complicated, than the challenges that were faced during the Cold War. Also, all of these challenges are too great to be met by one nation alone; therefore, the world's current economic situation after the onset of the 2008 recession has severely limited the means of each of these nations to individualistically address these interconnected challenges and the potential of multilateral burden sharing for these problems is a strong attraction if not a down right necessity to the West—even for the United States.¹⁹⁶

It is the complex nature of the West's challenges that allow fear and attraction to motivate leaders toward multilateral involvement and also to motivate Western states to pass as much responsibility to others while seeking to gather maximum benefit of multilateral institutions to themselves that keep the West's multilateral "instinct" more present than ever. While perfect consensus is still impossible to meet, the potential of a single Western nation benefiting from its involvement in the United Nations, NATO,

¹⁹⁵ Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "Common Foreign and Security Policy," in *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 4th ed. ed. Helen Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 461–492.

¹⁹⁶ White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010).

European Union, or otherwise, will keep this instinct in place because of rational self-interest alone...for the time being.

Unfortunately, it may be the West's normative pressures—namely that every citizen is morally entitled to certain public goods—whether it be medical services, elderly pensions, unemployment insurance, or otherwise—combined with politician's fear of voters that may ultimately crash the current favorable multilateral order. History often demonstrates that the solutions of yesterday often create the problems of tomorrow. After World War II it was American style consumerism and social welfare that allowed Europe's Malthusian warriors to be replaced by new virtuous brats, an event which made former nationalist and class warriors turn into peaceful voters seeking state welfare and consumer goods instead of national aggrandizement and class warfare. Now, moving further away from the Cold War, the West now finds itself within a deleterious debt crisis that will surely lead to difficult times if not resolved. At the end of January 2013 the government debt to GDP ratio for the United States was 105 percent and the combined debt of all EU nations per its GDP exceeded 85 percent.¹⁹⁷

Debt is not necessarily the biggest risk to the world's current peaceful and multilateral order, but this debt's second and third order effects combined with politicians' fears of voters may lead to disaster. After all, the French Revolution itself was largely caused by the second- and third-order effects of the French state's debt. Further, it is largely normative characteristics and the mere essence of the modern West that has caused this debt problem in the first place. The emphasis on democratic governance combined with a minimal standard of human dignity for its voters—whether it be liberty or an acceptable living standard—has led Western politicians to promise state goods to its citizens that government revenue's cannot provide for. Much like Western politicians had to choose between what is prudent or popular in the interwar period, modern politicians are now in the same boat and must choose between pleasing their

¹⁹⁷ "U.S. Debt Clock," *U.S. Debt Clock.org*. <http://www.usdebtclock.org/>; The Associated Press, "Euro Debt Burden Stuck at High 90 Percent of GDP," *The Seattle Times*, January 22, 2013, http://seattletimes.com/html/business/technology/2020185821_apeueuropefinancialcrisis.html

electorates—that often view welfare a right—or making the hard choices necessary to reduce debt.¹⁹⁸

Unfortunately, history does not provide a favorable track record when politicians have to choose between what is prudent or popular and electorates could very well be in favor of continuing the gravy train they receive from the state over that of making personal sacrifices necessary for their governments to reduce debt. After all, it is easy for a voter to place primacy on his state pension over that of his government's financial well-being. Ironically, most voters may normatively agree that debt must be reduced, but just as NATO nations agreed that all nations must contribute more to defense against the Soviet Union, the path to solving this problem is blocked by all parties' unwillingness to accept sacrifices of their own whether they be a politicians, welfare recipients, or taxpayers. Additionally, it usually is easier for a politician to vote for more loans and increase debt than it is to tell his electorates that they need to sacrifice as welfare recipients or taxpayers.

Essentially, the current debt crisis is similar to the whole burden-sharing dynamic within Cold War NATO but is now permeated all the way down to each individual politician and voter in the West. This problem, however, could be similar to that of the interwar period, and ironically, democracy and Western values themselves present a dreadful challenge upon the current multilateral order because eventually the debt chicken will come home to roost if the West is unable to solve its debt crisis.

The world depression and debt crisis is already taking a toll on the European Union. As nations struggle to deal with their debt amidst a recession, not only is public opinion of the EU falling broadly, but right-wing nationalist, green leftist, and other fringe parties are gaining ground and hold political power that was unthinkable just ten years ago. For example, the Jobbik Party of Hungary gained 47 seats in parliament in 2010; in 2006 this party had zero. Even the Netherlands has seen rises in nationalist politics; the Party for Freedom—a party regarded by many as xenophobic—won 15

¹⁹⁸ Suzanne Daley, "Danes Rethink a Welfare State Ample to a Fault," *The New York Times*, April 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/world/europe/danes-rethink-a-welfare-state-ample-to-a-fault.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

percent of the popular vote and only fell seven parliament seats short of the country's leading party. Also alarming for multilateralism is an emerging generational gap; younger voters—under the age of 36—are only about half as supportive as the EU as an instrument of peace as those voters 55 and older. In other words, the habitus of Cold War common security is suffering a generational death.¹⁹⁹

Furthermore, Europe's working class is also becoming less favorable to the EU because traditionally affluent nations like France now find their workers competing with the "Polish plumber" and other low-wage workers from Eastern Europe able to undercut host workers' wages and employment opportunity. When this circumstance is combined with racism and xenophobia's gaining popularity, it is easy to see how the conditions created by the 2008 recession and the ongoing debt crises, via its austerity attempts, are giving the average European plenty to be frustrated over.²⁰⁰

Attempts are being made to remedy debt in Europe, but what is yet to be seen is how prudent financial crises management will be rewarded at the polls within Europe over time, and therefore, how long domestic political situations within both creditor and borrowing nations will allow for current patterns of bailing out at risk countries to continue. As Germans experience their own economic hardships, with their own economy shrinking half a percent in the last quarter of 2012, one has to imagine that political forces in the future will make the German government less likely to grant loans to debt crises countries like Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.²⁰¹

Much as the United States cut aid and loans before the onset of the Great Depression, Europe's future could be worse than its economic conditions are today if the Germans, banks, or other entities capable of offering loans and assistance find themselves

¹⁹⁹ Charles Kupchan, "As Nationalism Rises, Will the European Union Fall?," *The Washington Post*, August 29, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/27/AR2010082702138.html>.

²⁰⁰ Stefano Bianchini, "The Resurgence of Nationalism in Times of Crisis: The Yugoslav Collapse, The EU Uncertain Future, and the Prospect of Reconciliation in the Balkans," *European University Institute*, March 16, 2012, p. 6-8. http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/cecchi/documents/Bianchini_2012.pdf.

²⁰¹ Marcus Bensasson, "Europe's Economy Shrinks Most Since Depths of 2009 Recession," *Financial Post.com*, February 14, 2013, <http://business.financialpost.com/2013/02/14/europes-economy-shrinks-most-since-depths-of-2009-recession/>.

unwilling or unable to “stop-gap” Europe’s debt crises. When one considers that some countries like Greece and Spain already have unemployment rates over 50 percent for citizens age 25 and younger, the proclamations like that of Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, that “Greek democracy is facing perhaps its biggest ever challenge,” and “It’s about the cohesion of our society, which is being threatened by rising unemployment, like at the end of the Weimar Republic in Germany,” must force one to at least consider the potential that the West’s current multilateral success may be in grave danger over time.²⁰² Greece in many ways offers haunting resemblances of Weimar Germany in more than just economic crises; its domestic neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, became the country’s third largest party in 2012. It only had 0.29 percent of the vote in 2009.²⁰³

What happens when debt is bad enough and no outside entity is willing to grant loans? What happens if, like interwar Germany, liberal governance and its ideals—which has historically been designed to protect the rule of law and the rights of all—are no longer acceptable solutions to the average citizen belonging to a nation’s majority or plurality who are in dire straits themselves? If nations are no longer able to provide a minimal standard of living to its citizens through a vibrant economy or state welfare, who is going to be an attractive option to voters in all of their frustration? Who is going to have the sway? Will it be the politicians that preach peace and unity; or will it be the politicians whom tap into primitive instincts of mankind and find a scapegoat to focus anger toward as an option to meet citizens’ needs through zero-sum and Malthusian means? At what point is another Hitler or Mussolini like figure, though in a modern a more acceptable form, able to capture the frustration and anger of a downtrodden people unwilling to admit that their own essence and voting patterns are the cause of their problems in the first place? At what point are people willing to be led by an charismatic leader that directs their Malthusian anger, created by their own ideals, toward an

²⁰² Louise Armistead, “Greek Crisis is ‘Like the Weimar Republic,’” *The Telegraph*, October 5, 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9591004/Greek-crisis-is-like-the-Weimar-Republic.html>.; Steve Hawkes, “Youth Unemployment at Record High,” *The Sun*, February 21, 2013, <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4734360/youth-unemployment-at-record-high.html>.;

²⁰³ Helena Smith, “Greece’s Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Goes Global with Political Ambitions,” *The Guardian*, April 1, 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/01/greece-golden-dawn-global-ambitions>.

domestic subgroup—like the Jew of the past, or the banker or the foreign low-wage worker today—or worst, toward an outside nation as a coping mechanism for their suffering?

Will the violation of a minority “other’s” property, rights, or dignity be an acceptable method of alleviating a majority’s or plurality’s own suffering? If one is desperate enough, like Germany in the 1930s, it may be; this time however, the West’s own essence of democracy and a right to one’s own entitled financial dignity may be as destructive in the future as antagonistic nationalism was in Europe’s early 20th century. And all of this, whether it be domestic subjugation of others, or war between nations, will be because of the fears and attractions of politicians and their voters.

Therefore, the modern multilateral world order may in itself, by its very essence captured by Western values, create conditions and challenges too great for any multilateral order to survive because of the fears and attractions of its politicians may very well cause them to pursue popular means over that of prudence, or even worse, the rights of “others.” And not to forget, such environments invite an entirely different type of politician to enter the democratic game in the first place—much like the Nazis found a home in German politics in interwar Germany. Signally, Western multilateralism may find itself in the future as insignificant to the voter and politician as it was in 1914 and 1939 if desperate Malthusian voters rule the day.

If all of these musings seem to be fear-mongering and unrealistic, imagine all of the nations that make up the West unable to borrow money while their economies suffer from soaring inflation and unemployment...and then combine that with the fears and attractions of the West’s politicians—and more importantly—their downtrodden and newly Malthusian voters that have an expectation of the lifestyle they are currently accustomed and want something, anything, to place blame beside their own voting behaviors. On top of that, imagine a United States not able to offer a credible security guarantee while it deals with its own debt and economic crisis; not to mention how that would affect the decision making cycle of European leaders if Russia remains committed to expanding its sphere of influence into Eastern Europe.

Western multilateralism, and the current peaceful environment the West enjoys for that matter, is largely the symptom of Western prosperity and economic growth over the last sixty or so years with America leading the way in security and trade; however, with the United States in its own financial trouble and finding its own ways to cut expenses—including military power—combined with a weakening Europe experiencing a debt crisis—not to mention the return of antagonistic nationalism and ideological extremism—are all forces that shape politicians' fears and attractions, and do so deleteriously at the expense of multilateral peace...even for the altruistically post-modern, sophisticated, and self-proclaimed enlightened West.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective." In *Security Communities*, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 1–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Arendt, Hannah. *On Violence*. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1970.
- Berend, Ivan. *History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.
- EU Commission (Commission Staff Working Paper) *Turkey 2011 Progress Report*, 2012. European Commission. Accessed March 7, 2013.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf.
- Colley, Linda. *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
- Devine, James. "The Cause of the 1929–33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation." *Research in Political Economy*, 14 (1994): 119–167.
- De Grazia, Victoria. *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through 20th-Century Europe*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Daley, Suzanne. "Danes Rethink a Welfare State Ample to a Fault." *New York Times*, April 20, 2013. Accessed April 24, 2013.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/world/europe/danes-rethink-a-welfare-state-ample-to-a-fault.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>.
- Fisher, Louis. "Presidential Wars." In *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, edited by Eugene Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, 160–162. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
- Forster, Anthony and William Wallace. "Common Foreign and Security Policy." in *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 4th edition., edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace. New York: Oxford, 2000.
- Gill, George. *The League of Nations: From 1929 to 1946*. New York: Avery, 1996.
- Gray, Colin. *War, Peace and International Relations*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Gheciu, Alexandra. *NATO in the "New Europe": The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. Kindle edition.

- Gould, Andre. *Origins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- Guy, John. "The Tudor Age: 1485–1603." In *The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain*. Edited by Kenneth Morgan, 223–285. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Habermass, Jürgen. *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response*. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
- Hall, Walter. *World Wars and Revolutions*. New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1943.
- Harvie, Christopher. *Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707–1977*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa." In *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed, edited by Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: Norton, 2010) 28.
- Herring, George. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Kindle edition.
- Howard, Michael. *War and the Liberal Conscience*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986. Kindle edition.
- Joffe, Josef. "Europe’s American Pacifier." *Foreign Policy*, no. 54 (Spring 1984): 64–82.
- Jordan, Robert. *Norstad, Cold War NATO Supreme Commander: Airman, Strategist, Diplomat*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
- Kagan, Robert. "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, no. 113 (June and July 2002): 3–18. <http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/Course%20Readings/RKagan.pdf>.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations*. New York: Random House, 2006.
- Keohane, Daniel. "ESDP and NATO." In *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years 1999–2009*, edited by Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane, 134–135, 137–139. Paris: EU Institute of Security Studies, 2009.
- Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. New York: Longman, 2001.
- de Lisle, Leanda. *After Elizabeth: The Rise of James of Scotland and the Struggle for the Throne of England*. New York: Ballantine Books, 2005.
- Lundestad, Geir "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research*, 23, no. 3, (September, 1986): 263–270.

- Menon, Anand. *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981–1997: The Politics of Ambivalence*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. 7–12.
- Mitchison, Rosalind. *A History of Scotland*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Morrill, John. “The Stuarts: 1603–1688.” In *The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain*, Edited by Kenneth Morgan, 286–352. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Risse, Thomas. *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. London: Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Rothenberg, Gunther. “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment.” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret, 303–304. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Ruggie, John. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” *International Organization*, 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982): 379–415.
- Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001.
- Schimtt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political*. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2007. Kindle Edition.
- Sloan, Stanley. *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010. Kindle edition.
- Snyder, Jack. “Averting Anarchy in New Europe.” in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, expanded ed. Edited by Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, 104–140. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001.
- Steiner, Zara. *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Tardy, Thierry. “The UN and the Use of Force: A Marriage Against Nature.” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1, (2007): 49–70.
- Taylor, Alan, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1918*. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Thies, Wallace. *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting*. New York: M.E. Sharp, 2003.
- Thomas, Ian. *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997.

- Sigmund, Paul, ed. *St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1988.
- Smith, Helena. "Greece's Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn Goes Global with Political Ambitions." *Guardian*, April 1, 2013.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/01/greece-golden-dawn-global-ambitions>.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Yearbook* (2012).<http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/04>.
- United Nations, History, <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml>
- U.S. Army, "Battle Command," in *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations*, TRADOC:
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch5.htm>.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *Field Listing: GDP*. Washington, DC: OPA, 2012.
<https://www.cia.gov/contact-cia/index.html>.
- Vucheva, Elitsa. "EU Still 'Digesting' 2004 Enlargement Five Years On." *EU Observer.com*, <http://euobserver.com/15/28049>
- Wallace, William. "European Defense Co-operation: The Reopening Debate." *Survival*, Vol. 26 No. 6 (November 1984): 250–259.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979.
- Williams, Basil. *The Whig Supremacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California